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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

DOING ENVY JUSTICE: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF ENVY
Conservatives and liberals disagree about the underlying motivations driving opposition
to concentrated wealth. Liberals contend that such objections are often driven by
legitimate fairness concerns, whereas conservatives frequently cite envy instead.
Research and theory suggest that two particularly important contextual questions with
respect to emotional reactions to wealth are its source (inherited or earned), and how that
wealth is put to use, which could interactively and differentially influence liberals’ and
conservatives’ reactions to affluent individuals. The current study aimed to empirically
address whether liberals actually are more prone to envy than conservatives, both in
general and in response to specific wealthy people of different backgrounds.
Participants (N = 800) reported their reactions to ostensibly-real, wealthy entrepreneurs
described in articles from a business news website. Liberals tended to respond with
slightly more envy than conservatives across conditions, and controlling for several
potential confounding factors, liberal political ideology was weakly positively correlated
with dispositional envy. People across the political spectrum responded with greater envy
in response to wealthy entrepreneurs who harmed others in the pursuit of wealth than
entrepreneurs who did not harm others. However, liberals’ envy was increased more
strongly by entrepreneurial harm-doing than conservatives’, and this difference was
explained by greater perceived harm and unfairness. On the other hand, only
conservatives reacted with greater envy to entrepreneurs who inherited their wealth rather
than having earned it through hard work. Especially because, in addition to envy, liberals
felt somewhat more resentment, moral disgust, and anger toward the wealthy
entrepreneurs, further research will be necessary to fully understand the role of political
ideology in reactions to affluent people.
KEYWORDS: Envy, Liberalism, Conservatism, Resentment, Inequality, Justice
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Chapter One: Introduction
United States President Barack Obama remarked in a 2013 speech that economic
inequality “is the defining challenge of our time” and that frustration with that inequality
is “rooted in the nagging sense that no matter how hard [average Americans] work, the
deck is [unfairly] stacked against them.” The speech echoed concerns voiced at the 2012
Democratic National Convention, in which Massachusetts Democrat Elizabeth
Warren declared that “the system is rigged” in favor of the wealthy and against the middle
class (ABC News, 2012). That same year, President Obama led a failed effort to institute a
“Buffett Rule” to raise taxes on millionaires and billionaires who were “unfairly” paying
lower rates on their investment earnings than middle-income Americans were on their
wages (Davis, 2012).
Conservatives often claim that liberal complaints about economic inequality and
policy proposals aimed at redressing them are not, in reality, driven by the morallyacceptable fairness concerns liberals frequently cite when demanding changes to the
existing economic order. During the 2012 Presidential campaign, Republican candidate
Mitt Romney was asked to respond to those who criticized substantial wealth disparities in
the United States. In his reply, Romney stated, “I think it's about envy. I think it's about
class warfare.” Columnist Kathleen Parker (2013) expressed a similar opinion quite
plainly when she wrote, “Envy is the core emotion driving the current debate about
income inequality and the notion that the poor are poor because the rich are rich.”
The starkly contrasting views of leading liberals and conservatives typify a
longstanding debate in American politics on how one should react to the great financial
success of others. Are conservative thinkers often correct in attributing complaints over
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disparities to envy? Or, as liberal thinkers suggest, do they more often reflect concerns
over justice and fairness? The interpretation of negative reactions to wealth is no trivial
matter. Because of envy’s repugnant nature (e.g., Smith & Kim, 2007), the motivations of
people who seem driven by it are instantly cheapened, even legitimately scorned. By
contrast, if expressed concerns about justice and fairness seem valid, then the motivation
is honored and legitimized—and corrective action is the logical consequence. Votes are in
the balance. Elections, therefore, partly hinge on which party wins this perennial
attributional debate.
Political Ideology
Research on conservatism and liberalism reveals a complex, multi-faceted picture
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b; Tetlock & Murphy, 1993; Wojcik,
Hovasapian, Graham, Motyl, and Ditto, 2015). Nevertheless, there are consistent themes.
For example, in a landmark meta-analytic review of the psychological literature on
political conservatism, Jost and colleagues (2003a) concluded that the psychological bases
for conservative ideology were (1) perceived threat from the environment, and (2)
aversion to uncertainty. These bases ultimately motivate system-justification,
authoritarianism, and various other psychological characteristics commonly associated
with political conservatives (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950;
Altemeyer, 1981, 1996; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). These factors underpin a “conservative”
belief system with two core, related aspects, namely (1) support for or rationalization of
inequality, and (2) resistance to change (Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b). This “uncertaintythreat” model of political conservatism not only attempted to identify and tie together
common themes in the empirical literature on political ideology, but also suggested
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conservatives have a fundamental tendency toward viewing inequality as just and fair.
Notably, core tenets of the uncertainty-threat model were empirically supported in a later
set of three cross-sectional studies (Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin,
2007).1
To the extent that liberal and conservative political ideologies represent opposite
ends of a bipolar ideological spectrum, liberalism may imply a relative lack of
uncertainty-threat, therefore leading to the opposition to inequality and calls for change so
often associated with political progressives. Indeed, although definitions and
operationalizations of political ideology vary widely and political ideology is a complex
topic (Wojcik et al., 2015), a number of scholars have used bipolar measures implying
that, to a large extent, liberalism and conservatism may be considered opposites (e.g., Jost,
2006; Napier & Jost, 2008).
Political ideology is also associated with basic personality differences that
arguably are in keeping with both the abovementioned differences between liberal and
conservative belief systems and the uncertainty-threat model. For example, liberals tend to
be greater in openness to experience and one of two aspects of agreeableness, compassion
(which is associated with liberal egalitarianism), while conservatives are better organized,
conscientious, and polite (the other aspect of agreeableness, which helps in maintaining
the social order) (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson,
2010). Clearly, conservatives and liberals differ appreciably in terms of a variety of

Specifically, higher levels of uncertainty avoidance (e.g., low openness to experience) and threat
management concerns (e.g., perceptions that the world is a dangerous place) correlated positively with
conservatism in each study within Jost et al. (2007). In the final study, moreover, the relationships between
conservatism and threat and conservatism and uncertainty avoidance were mediated via opposition to
equality and resistance to change, respectively.
1

3

psychological characteristics, beliefs, and even personality traits. Perhaps the most
consequential difference for purposes of the current study is conservatives’ tendency to
react less negatively to perceived inequality than liberals, consistent with the uncertaintythreat model and empirical research on the psychology of political ideology. However,
additional research suggests conservative “endorsement” of inequality may apply more to
inequality of outcomes than inequality of opportunity.2 As fairness concerns are often
crucial in the experiences of envy and resentment, differences in how fairness is defined
by conservatives and liberals may lead to differences in their levels of envy and/or
resentment of wealthy people.
Political Ideology and Perceived Fairness
Both liberals and conservatives value fairness (e.g., Haidt, 2012), but they have
different conceptions of what would qualify as “fair” outcomes. Liberals are more likely
to view equality of outcomes as a valid basis for fairness judgments (Jost, 2006; Rasinski,
1987). In contrast, conservatives tend to base such judgments on the perceived
proportionality between inputs (e.g., the perceived value of a worker’s labor) and
outcomes (e.g., a worker’s salary) (Adams, 1965; Gollwitzer & van Prooijen, 2016; Haidt,
2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007), although the perceived value of such inputs, and thus the
“proportional,” deserved outcomes, often involves subjective judgment. Of course, such
subjective judgments may be systematically influenced in the direction of greater
perceived fairness by beliefs (e.g., belief in a just world) and motivated cognitive

This statement does not imply that conservatives are entirely unconcerned about distributive justice and
equality of outcomes. Recent research in both the US (Norton & Ariely, 2011) and Australia (Norton, Neal,
Ariely, & Holland, 2014) indicates that Americans and Australians across the political spectrum would
prefer greater equality in the national distribution of wealth (or, put another way, greater society-wide
distributive justice).
2
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processes, such as system-justification, known to be more common among conservatives
(Jost et al., 2003a; Lerner, 1980). A natural consequence of these dynamics is
conservatives’ greater acceptance of unequal outcomes—some people’s inputs are worth
more than others, and thus inequality, even substantial inequality, is not necessarily
perceived to be unfair.
Relative to conservatives, liberals’ general way of viewing fairness (often in terms
of equality), their beliefs, and motivated cognitive processes likely predispose them to
perceiving great disparities in wealth as inherently unfair or unjust (Janoff-Bulman &
Carnes, 2013), an unfairness which may enhance envy and resentment of those possessing
it (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009; van de Ven, 2015). To be clear, however,
liberals also value proportionality, and desire a more just world, despite believing the
world is less fair than do conservatives (Engel & Martin, 2015; Tyler, 2011). For example,
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2016) voiced her support for a change in
overtime rules primarily benefitting lower-middle income workers in declaring that “[W]e
need to…restore the basic bargain that built America’s mighty middle class—that if you
work hard and play by the rules, you can get ahead and stay ahead” (emphasis added).
Both conservatives’ and liberals’ reactions to wealthy people might therefore be sensitive
to contextual factors impacting judgments of the wealthy people’s advantageous
outcomes. Such factors might include whether or not the outcomes were earned through
hard work and whether actions taken in pursuit of those outcomes violated the implicit or
explicit “rules” governing ethical economic behavior (e.g., not harming others for one’s
own benefit).
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I now address a number of challenges that may arise when investigating how
political ideology and contextual factors might influence envious responses to wealth. To
fully understand such envy, however, other emotional responses to perceived unfairness or
injustice should also be taken into account, most notably resentment, but also anger and
moral disgust.
Challenges to Empirically Investigating Emotional Reactions to Wealthy People
In spite of abundant lay commentaries on the subject and its role in the
contemporary political debate over inequality in America, there is relatively little
psychological research on political ideology and envious reactions to great wealth. A
recent correlational study by Harris and Henniger (2013), however, examined the
relationship between dispositional envy and political ideology, using an online sample
ranging widely in age and income. They found a weak, positive relationship between leftwing ideology and dispositional envy, which became non-significant after controlling for
participant age.3 The study therefore provided little evidence for claims by conservatives
that complaints against great wealth might be linked to envy inspired by liberal political
ideology. As will be seen, however, there are important conceptual reasons one should not
assume that similar results would also obtain when examining envy toward specific
wealthy people.
Defining envy. Systematically examining liberal and conservative explanations for
complaints against concentrated wealth (and income inequality) presents a number of
conceptual and methodological challenges. One issue is how to define envy. As with other
research on social emotions, including envy, and on related moral judgments (e.g.,

3

Younger participants tended to be higher in dispositional envy and further left on the political spectrum.
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perceived injustice), results and conclusions could vary dramatically on the basis of how
such phenomena are defined and operationalized (Feather, 2012; Harris & Henniger,
2013; Hoogland, Thielke, & Smith, in press; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Smith & Kim,
2007). Thus, it is vitally important to delineate what is meant by the rather nebulous term
“envy” in the context of the current work.
Although there is considerable definitional debate in current theoretical and
empirical research on envy, virtually all definitions of envy are similar in that they posit
an upward social comparison as the basic antecedent to envy, and almost all agree that
envy is at least somewhat painful or unpleasant (i.e., negatively-valenced) (but see Leach,
Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). However, much of the disagreement over other
aspects of envy comes down to whether envy necessarily includes a degree of hostility
toward the envied. The question is so critical that many researchers conclude that envy
may assume two distinct forms, hostile envy and benign envy (Smith & Kim, 2007; van de
Ven, Hoogland, Smith, van Dijk, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2015). This distinction has
huge implications. Hostile envy clearly is more likely to lead to negative effects for the
envied person (e.g., back stabbing, undermining, etc.; Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper, &
Aquino, 2012; Foster, 1972) and, indeed, unhappy consequences for the envying person as
well (e.g., guilt and shame; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007). In fact, failure to clarify the
distinction at the conceptual and empirical levels has led to confusion about the role of
envy in various outcomes aside from reactions to great wealth (e.g., reactions to the
misfortunes of various enviable people, such as schadenfreude4).

For example, finding a link as intuitively “obvious” as that between envy of an advantaged person and
schadenfreude following his or her status-leveling downfall depends on researchers’ understanding and
measurement of envy. Specifically, envy containing hostility and ill-will toward the advantaged person does
lead to schadenfreude, whereas non-hostile, benign envy, and coveting (i.e., merely wanting what another
4
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In the present research, I largely focus on hostile envy. Hostile envy corresponds to
the more traditional sense of how envy, sometimes called “envy proper,” is understood in
most religious, philosophical, and literary traditions (for a review, see Smith & Kim,
2007). To illustrate with one very early example, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (350 B.C.E./1924;
Book II, Chapter 10), the ancient Greek philosopher’s discussion of envy repeatedly
highlighted its hostile aspects: “We feel [envy]…not with the idea of getting something
for ourselves, but because the other people have it [implying that the other people seem
unworthy of that thing];” “We also envy those whose possession of or success in a thing is
a reproach to us;” “[Enviable people who have suffered a misfortune] will feel no pity
from us [i.e., those who envy them].” Also, envy proper corresponds more closely to how
envy appears to be conceived of in everyday political debates. Returning to Mitt
Romney’s appraisal of liberal complaints against wealth concentration as “class warfare,”
it is clear that his view is that liberals often have envy-based ill will against well-moneyed
people because of wealthy people’s superior outcomes and liberals’ presumed desire for
them to lose their advantages. That is, the focus is less on wanting what the others have
and much more on a hostile desire for them to lose their advantages.
In sum, my primary approach to investigating the possible link between political
ideology and envy entailed defining envy in terms similar to how it is conceived
traditionally, by many contemporary envy scholars, and by political conservatives, such as
Mitt Romney, who question the motives of those who actively oppose wealth
has), do not (Smith, Thielke, & Powell, 2014; van de Ven et al., 2015; cf. Feather & Sherman, 2002; Hareli
& Weiner, 2002; Leach et al., 2003; Leach & Spears, 2008). In contrast, Harris and Henniger (2013) found
similar associations between political liberalism and two different measures of dispositional envy, namely
the full Dispositional Envy Scale (DES; Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999) and an ad hoc,
dispositional “materialistic envy” scale, which focused on the desire for physical goods and was comprised
of 3 items from the DES.
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concentration in the United States. That is, I define envy as a begrudging, hostility-laden
emotion. Doing so allowed for a more direct investigation of whether liberals actually are
more prone to “envy” wealthy people in the particularly socially-undesirable sense of the
term used more typically by laypeople and scholars—as well as those who claim that
liberals are feeling the emotion.5
Examining trait vs. state envy. Another challenge to studying envy concerns
whether it is being examined from a trait or state perspective. Indeed, envy has been
studied as both an enduring disposition and a fleeting emotional state (Lange & Crusius,
2015; van de Ven et al., 2015), as well as a conscious or unconscious experience (e.g.,
Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007). For instance, research by Harris and Henniger (2013)
focused on self-reported general tendencies toward envy and did not measure real-time
emotional reactions to specific enviable people. For a variety of reasons, the distinction
between envy as a disposition and envy as an emotional state is a particularly important
one to make when examining whether envy differs as a function of political ideology. For
one, even people very low in the dispositional tendency to feel envy may experience
powerful feelings of (state) envy given the right circumstances. It is also possible that
liberals or conservatives do not differ at all in terms of their dispositional tendencies
toward feeling envy but that liberals (or conservatives) might still feel more state envy in
specific circumstances. Envy of wealthy people could be one such circumstance, given
that liberals and conservatives differ considerably in terms of their perceptions of
concentrated wealth and, presumably, those who possess it (Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Janoff-

Nonetheless, although not the primary topic of investigation, this study also explored whether and how
other forms of envy (such as “benign envy”) were associated with political ideology, given the ongoing
scholarly debate over how envy, in whatever form(s), should be defined and measured (Smith & Kim, 2007;
Smith, 1991, 2013; van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009).
5
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Bulman & Carnes, 2013). Such perceptions might, of course, tend to either exacerbate or
ameliorate liberals’ and/or conservatives’ envy of specific wealthy people.
The pattern of results across dispositional and state envy could also be instructive.
For example, if the magnitude of the difference between liberals and conservatives on
envy is greater on (1) state envy of specific wealthy people than it is on (2) dispositional
envy, this might suggest that certain aspects of exceptionally financially successful people
(or their histories) are exacerbating what might normally be a very slight difference in
envy between conservatives and liberals (e.g., some wealthy people’s having received
large inheritances, giving them a major advantage in life). In sum, the current study allows
for an investigation of not only envy as a disposition (by the inclusion of personality
questionnaires on dispositional envy), but also state envy in reaction to specific kinds of
wealthy people, who may be perceived differently by people on opposite sides of the
conservative-liberal divide.
Differentiating envy and resentment. The current study examines more than the
very broad question of whether envious reactions to wealthy people vary as a function of
political ideology. Envy is only one of a number of different possible emotional reactions
to great wealth, and contextual factors might impact liberals’ and conservatives’ reactions
to wealthy people in many different ways. In addition to envy, such contextual factors
could influence fairness or justice perceptions, as well as levels of morally-relevant
emotions other than envy, such as resentment. If, for example, liberals do indeed tend to
envy wealthy individuals more than conservatives, such envy and resulting opposition to
their wealth might still be “legitimated” to the extent that the envy is accompanied or
explained by justice concerns often cited by liberals as the “true” reasons for their
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objections to concentrated wealth (Rawls, 1971). In sum, the current study obviates the
possibility of over-attributing important political ideology-based differences in reactions
to wealthy people to envy alone and oversimplifying a potentially much more nuanced,
context-dependent and emotionally complex reality.
Distinguishing envy from related emotions can be challenging, but doing so may
be especially important for understanding reactions to great wealth, in general, and how
such reactions are related to political ideology, in particular. As an earlier example
suggests, it is likely that liberals believe their concerns over great wealth are captured by
feelings of resentment and legitimate judgments of unfairness. By contrast, it appears that
conservatives are not only more likely to view great wealth as fair in the first place, but
also to view liberal complaints as motivated by envy.
Disentangling the emotion of envy (especially hostile envy) from
resentment/feelings of unfairness is far from straightforward, but the advantages of an
approach in which envy and resentment are examined separately are at least four-fold.
First, although envy and resentment often co-occur, unlike envy, resentment can be
experienced in the absence of any sense that someone else is advantaged relative to
oneself. Second, separating resentment from envy allows resentment to represent a sense
of anger or hostility that is (at least ostensibly) free of envious feelings, and therefore
more socially acceptable or “legitimate.” Third, separating envy-based resentful feelings
from resentment proper acknowledges the vital role of different kinds of fairness
judgments to the experiences of envy and resentment. Specifically, the dividing line
between resentment proper and invidious resentment (the hostile component of envy) is
the perception of whether the great majority of other “reasonable” people would agree that
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the other person’s advantage is unjust—if so, the advantage is “objectively” unjust and the
resulting feeling is more akin to “resentment proper” and thus more socially-acceptable; if
not, the unfairness is more personal or “subjective,” and the resulting feeling is more akin
to “invidious resentment” (Hoogland et al., in press; Smith & Kim, 2007; Smith, Parrott,
Ozer, & Moniz, 1994). By incorporating “invidious resentment” as a part of envy, envy so
defined includes the subjective sense of injustice necessary for envy to take on its
prototypical, hostile form (Smith & Kim, 2007; Smith et al., 1994) without precluding the
possibility of “pure” resentment, or resentment unalloyed with feelings of envy. Finally,
and more simply, finding conservative-liberal differences on not just envy but also
resentment of different sorts of wealth would suggest a more central role for fairness
judgments in driving ideology-based differences in reactions to wealth.
Examining the roles of anger and moral disgust. Likely because of its close
linkage with unfairness appraisals, anger is often experienced in morally-relevant
situations (Batson et al., 2007), and anger often co-occurs with other negative emotions,
such as resentment, which is itself a form of anger. Considering liberals often react more
negatively to inequality than conservatives, anger is an emotion particularly relevant to the
study of differences between liberals and conservatives in reactions to wealth. Perceived
unfair treatment is a prototypical appraisal in the experience of anger (Frijda, Kuipers, &
ter Schure, 1989), although, strictly speaking, unfairness appraisals are not necessary to
experience anger (Berkowitz, 1990; Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Izard, 1993).
Anger varies in intensity on the basis of various appraisals, including judgments that the
anger-eliciting actions were intentional, preventable, or unfair (Darley & Pittman, 2003;
Fernandez & Turk, 1995; Frijda et al., 1989). Because anger can occur in the absence of a
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perceived injustice or other moral violations, in this study, it was measured separately
from related constructs, such as resentment.
Moral disgust is another possible response to wealthy people that could depend on
both contextual factors and political ideology. This is because it is a reaction to perceived
moral violations, such as unfair treatment (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009;
Chapman & Anderson, 2014; Clark & Fessler, 2015; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt,
1999). Although frequently experienced simultaneously with anger, and sometimes even
used as a synonym for anger, moral disgust is not identical to anger (Chapman &
Anderson, 2013, 2014), and may have an even stronger relationship with perceived
unfairness than anger (Chapman et al., 2009).
Although no research before the current study has examined moral disgust in
response to particular wealthy people, mounting empirical evidence suggests that political
affiliation may influence moral disgust across a variety of situations. For example,
research has repeatedly linked conservatism with greater disgust sensitivity (e.g., Hodson,
& Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizzaro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012),
and disgust sensitivity with harsher moral judgments and negative attitudes toward
stigmatized groups, such as gay people and immigrants (Hodson & Costello, 2007; Inbar,
Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008).
Given the complex pattern of findings on links among conservatism, moral
judgments, and disgust, it is difficult to predict whether liberals or conservatives should be
more prone to feeling moral disgust toward wealthy people, whether overall or only in
response to specific kinds of wealthy people. On the one hand, conservatives are more
disgust-prone, and disgust may amplify moral condemnation of perceived unfairness. On
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the other, conservatives are less likely than liberals to perceive inequality as morally
wrong or unfair in the first place.
Contextual Factors in Reactions to Wealth
A primary challenge to examining emotional reactions to great wealth is that there
are undoubtedly any number of contextual factors crucial to predicting emotional reactions
to particular cases of great wealth. This is bound to be true regardless of the political
leanings of the beholder, although such leanings could well moderate the impact of those
factors. Thus, the question is not whether liberals envy those with great wealth, but rather
what types of great wealth engender envy and what types engender resentment—or both.
Furthermore, it may be that some types of great wealth produce envy in both liberals and
conservatives and other types produce similar amounts of resentment. One of the main
goals of the present research was to systematically examine aspects of great wealth that
should reveal both similarities and differences in how liberals and conservatives might
react to such wealth. Doing so would not only recast the possibly simplistic question of
whether liberals are more envious than conservatives, but also help in understanding when
differences in their emotional reactions might be more envy-based or resentment-based.
Initial source of wealth: Inherited or earned through hard work. One
especially important contextual factor may be how a wealthy person became wealthy in
the first place. The wealth may have come in the form of an easily-obtained gift from
family (e.g., an inheritance), or it instead might have been earned through years of hard
work. That is, the person’s initial wealth may signify either unearned privilege or
something closer to an up-by-the-bootstraps, rags-to-riches story. The issue here is that the
perception of great wealth is likely affected by whether it is perceived to be “deserved” or
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not. This is not a trivial distinction. Basic social psychological research indicates that
perceived personal responsibility for an outcome is a key determinant of the perceived
deservedness (or fairness) of that outcome (Feather, 1999), as well as emotional reactions
to that outcome (Feather, 2006; van Dijk, Goslinga, & Ouwerkerk, 2008). For example,
according to Feather’s (2006, 2012) deservingness theory, resentment is likely to result
when another person experiences an undeserved positive outcome, and joy (or
schadenfreude) may occur when that person loses the undeserved positive outcome—
either way, a sense of justice and “balance” between the other person’s actions and
outcomes is restored (Feather, 2006; 2012; Heider, 1958; van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, &
Goslinga, 2009). Furthermore, the literature on fairness and justice perceptions suggests
that the process by which the distribution of resources was determined, or procedural
justice, generally impacts evaluations of wealth to an even greater extent than distributive
justice, or the overall distribution of resources (Tyler, 2011). Thus, because a wealthy
person who inherited his or her wealth would not be seen as responsible for and therefore
deserving of it, that wealth would be perceived as less fair than wealth gained more slowly
through great effort.
In the present study, participants reacted to examples of great wealth that was
either inherited or “earned” through hard work. This manipulation had a number of
possible benefits for the research questions at hand. First, one might predict that,
regardless of political ideology, inherited wealth would produce more envy than earned
wealth. However, this pattern might be especially pronounced for liberals compared to
conservatives. Possibly, liberals would have equal and low amounts of envy in reaction to
earned wealth; inherited wealth would be where liberals part company with conservatives.
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But this pattern, even if it emerged, would be only half the story. Liberals might also
perceive the inherited wealth to be “objectively” less fair than would conservatives,
thereby increasing resentment.
The nature of liberal and conservative ideology also suggests a complex picture.
For example, the literature on just-world beliefs and system-justifying ideologies suggests
that conservatives generally perceive greater procedural justice in the society-wide process
of wealth allocation than liberals (Jost, 2006; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Lerner, 1980).
Simply put, the economic “system” often seems less “rigged” to conservatives than
liberals.6 Conservatives should therefore be more likely to assume that a specific wealthy
person deserves his or her wealth (even if much of it were inherited), at least in the
absence of clear evidence that it was ill-gotten. If so, envy (and resentment) should be low
across the board for conservatives. Additional literature suggests that although liberals and
conservatives alike are concerned about procedural economic justice (e.g., equal
opportunity to succeed in America’s relatively free-market economy), liberals place a
substantially greater emphasis on distributive justice (e.g., equality of outcomes) than
conservatives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). If so, envy (and resentment) should be
relatively high across the board for liberals.
In any event, manipulating the source of the target’s great wealth had the potential
to aid in better understanding how this key contextual factor might affect reactions in
general and also reveal the particular concerns of liberals and conservatives. Not only

The improbable rise of populist Republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump, who frequently and
publically has complained of US trade agreements that are stacked against average Americans by a selfenriching political and economic elite, suggests that large numbers of people across the political spectrum
may view the current socioeconomic order in the US as fundamentally unjust. Even so, the extent to which
ideologically “pure” conservatives, rather than dissatisfied current or former liberals, concur with Trump’s
statements on the economy (e.g., on free trade and outsourcing) is unclear.
6
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could the separate reactions of envy and resentment be examined, but the way in which
these two emotions relate to one another in each context could be addressed. For example,
would the source of wealth source influence both envy and resentment among liberals and
conservatives alike? Further, could wealth source influence the strength of the relationship
between political ideology and one or both of these emotions?
It should also be emphasized that this distinction between inherited and earned
wealth dovetails with many common examples in everyday life that appear to capture how
people differentially react to great wealth in general and as a function of political leanings
(e.g., popular perceptions of “privileged” heirs vs. equally-wealthy, self-made
businesspeople). Furthermore, as suggested already, the social psychological variables
underlying possible differences between liberals and conservatives in their reactions to
inherited and earned wealth represent longstanding theoretical and empirical traditions.
Harmfulness of actions related to wealth: Not harmful or harmful. Emotional
reactions to wealthy people should be influenced by the perceived source of their wealth,
but another factor suggested by empirical literature (especially on moral judgments;
Schein & Gray, 2015; Schein, Ritter, & Gray, in press) and the current political debates
over concentrated wealth and inequality may play an even more influential role.
Specifically, whether a rich person actively harmed less fortunate people in the pursuit of
greater wealth may be a stronger determinant of reactions to her wealth than how she
became wealthy in the first place. For example, a very well-heeled person might acquire a
company and lay people off in order to reap large profits, or, alternatively, he might earn
those same profits in ways that do not hurt workers. Per deservingness and balance
theories, a harm-doer’s wealth itself may be seen as unfair or unjust because “bad” people
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deserve congruent, “bad” outcomes (Feather, 2006; 2012; Heider, 1958). The harmful
actions are also very likely to be seen as at least somewhat procedurally unjust, and, as
mentioned, perceived procedural injustice engenders anger and resentment in response to
inequality. Moreover, psychological perspectives on moral judgment often emphasize the
role of perceived harm when people make judgments of right and wrong (e.g., Haidt,
2012, 2015). For example, Haidt’s popular book Righteous Minds (2012; Chapter 7) cites
harming others while personally profiting as a straightforward example of violating the
rules and principles of fairness, and empirical research on reactions to unfair treatment has
sometimes involved gauging how people react to another’s “unfairly” profiting at their
expense by deviating from an equitable, 50/50 division of resources (e.g., Chapman et al.,
2009). Although matters of procedural justice and deservingness perceptions are likely at
play (as with the manipulation of wealth source), manipulating harmfulness may be a
uniquely powerful way of increasing envy and resentment of wealthy people, as some
researchers have posited that judgments of harmfulness comprise the cardinal factor in
judgments of the morality and fairness of actions; in such a view, fairness judgments about
actions are modulated by the perceived degree of harm caused by those actions (e.g., Gray,
Waytz, & Young, 2012; Schein et al., in press; Schein & Gray, 2012). Given all this, a
major advantage of manipulating the harmfulness of actions taken in the pursuit of wealth
is that harmful actions can be expected to increase unfavorable reactions among people
across the entire political spectrum.
Harming others to obtain more wealth violates many people’s ideas of procedural
justice, and the harm caused by those actions in and of itself should lead to unfairness
judgments and moral condemnation. There would therefore seem to be an appreciable risk
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that harmfulness may “engulf the field,” in the sense that it might eliminate any possibility
of envy and/or resentment varying as a function of political ideology. Previous empirical
research, however, suggests that is not the case. Both liberals’ and conservatives’
judgments of morality may be made on the basis of perceived harm and fairness, but these
“moral foundations” are even more important to liberals than conservatives (Graham,
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Haidt, 2012).
Moreover, research on system justification and rationalization of inequality suggests that
conservatives should perceive self-enriching actions with negative economic
consequences for others to be more fair, and perhaps less harmful, than liberals (Jost &
Hunyady, 2003; 2005). This suggests that harmfulness should have even stronger effects
on envy and resentment among liberals than conservatives. To summarize, when a
wealthy person (at least seemingly) does no harm in the pursuit of wealth, both liberals
and conservatives might be expected to have relatively low levels of envy and resentment
of him or her, while clear harm-doing might enhance liberals’ envy and resentment to an
even stronger extent than for conservatives.
Clearly, personally-enriching, intentional acts that hurt other people are more
likely to be seen as unfair, ceteris paribus. However, political ideology may influence
reactions not only to wealthy people who have harmed others in the pursuit of wealth, but
also to wealthy people whose equally-lucrative business decisions did no apparent harm.
Due largely to distributive justice concerns and, possibly, less favorable views of wealthy
people in general, liberals might well experience somewhat stronger envious and/or
resentful feelings toward wealthy people who have done no apparent harm than
conservatives.

19

Before considering examples of wealthy people whose source of wealth and
actions varied widely (specifically, US presidents and presidential candidates), it should
be emphasized that the similar predictions often made on envy and resentment in this
study do not imply that they are considered synonymous or interchangeable. Envy of
harm-doing wealthy people might be higher among liberals because they might see such
actions as unfair in a relatively personal, subjective sense (e.g., “That may be how some
people think the economy is ‘supposed’ to work, but I still do not agree with it”).
Resentment might also be higher among liberals because they should be more likely to see
harmful actions as “objectively” unfair (e.g., “Anyone would agree that hurting people for
personal gain is morally wrong”) than conservatives, who are more likely to endorse
economic system-justifying ideologies. It should be noted that (un)fairness judgments
themselves are not envy or resentment, although they can be important antecedents to (or
even consequences of) those and other emotions, including anger and moral disgust. There
is substantial overlap among concepts such as envy, resentment, and fairness, but, as
suggested, these concepts are considered separately to the extent possible.
Crossing the manipulations. Examples from United States electoral history
illustrate that the ways in which wealthy individuals came to be wealthy, and the
consequences for others of their subsequent actions, can significantly influence how other
people react to them. First, part of President Andrew Jackson’s appeal to early 19thcentury Americans was the perception that he rose to wealth and influence through merit
despite beginning life in poverty, and Jackson’s campaign platform and actions while
president led him to be perceived as more of a populist than a plutocrat (UShistory.org).7
Ironically, Jackson had a reputation as a self-made man despite his immensely profitable use of slave labor,
which was the primary source of his wealth (Escobedo, 2016).
7
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However, even candidates from very privileged backgrounds are not necessarily viewed
negatively for their wealth. The very wealthy, patrician Franklin D. Roosevelt won 4
presidential elections, in no small part due to his expressed—and often realized—
intentions to use government to help people less fortunate than he and his fellow upper
class Americans. Decades later, however, another politician born into wealth saw his
presidential hopes dashed, in part, by portrayals of him as a self-interested harm-doer.
During the 2012 election season, Mitt Romney’s candidacy was damaged by allegations
that he unfairly profited by acquiring companies and laying people off during his tenure at
Bain Capital (e.g., Taibbi, 2012). Empirical research and these examples from US
presidential politics suggest that, while still influential, whether or not wealthy people
were born into privilege may play a lesser role in overall reactions to them than the
harmful or beneficial consequences of their subsequent choices for others.8
As shown above, psychological literature and historical examples suggest that the
source of wealthy people’s initial fortune and the potentially-harmful consequences for
others of their personally-enriching actions should influence others’ fairness judgments
and emotional reactions to them. Experimentally manipulating these factors may therefore
be an especially suitable way to investigate the central questions of the current research,
including the extent to which context impacts liberals’ and conservatives’ reactions to
wealthy people. One of the most important reasons I opted for the current design is that it

Although not a focus of the current study, perceived similarity to and resulting “affirmative” identification
with non-wealthy people (e.g., “I am an ‘average person’”) might be yet another factor at play in reactions to
wealthy people (Hogg & Turner, 1985). Negational identification, or defining one’s group in terms of what
it is not, could also have a role (e.g., “As a fellow ‘average person,’ I am not one of them [i.e., a member of
the American upper class]) (Zhong, Galinsky, & Unzueta, 2008). The negational identification process
might be especially likely when other “average people” have been harmed by a wealthy person’s actions. In
such circumstances, increased identification with the victims, through affirmative and/or negational
processes, should increase empathy for them and anger toward the wealthy person responsible for their
plight (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999).
8
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allowed for a test of both conservative and liberal lay theories regarding the origins of
opposition to wealth. For example, if liberals respond with more envy across contexts and
justice/fairness concerns do not mediate that relationship, then there would be a degree of
support for conservative critics’ accusations that liberal opposition to concentrated wealth
is based in envy, rather than differences in legitimate, unselfish justice concerns that may
accompany and help explain such envy.
A final advantage of the current design is that it focuses on reactions to
individuated wealthy people, rather than as a stereotyped group. The people at the top of
America’s income spectrum range from widely-disliked “vulture capitalists” to vaunted
Silicon Valley “angel investors” (Loewenstein, 2013). With this design, one can begin to
investigate the extent to which key contextual factors impact ideology-based differences in
reactions to the diverse group of people sometimes collectively known as “the rich.”
Overview
The current study aims to address the following primary questions: (1) Are liberals
generally more envious than conservatives?, (2) To what extent are liberals’ and
conservatives’ reactions to wealthy people and their behaviors influenced by (a) the source
of their initial wealth, and (b) the consequences for others of their personally-enriching
actions? Or, more broadly, to what extent does context matter to reactions to wealth
among liberals and conservatives?, and (3) Are any differences between liberals and
conservatives on envy in response to wealthy people explained by fairness/justice
concerns?
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Design Overview
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and University of Kentucky (UKY)
undergraduate participants read and reacted to two articles from a fictitious investment
news website detailing interviews with ostensibly-real, wealthy businessmen. In
counterbalanced order, participants responded to both Gary Taylor, who acquired a ball
bearing plant in Ohio, and Andy Simmons, who acquired a hubcap factory in Kansas.
Each entrepreneur either received a large monetary gift from family to start his business or
worked hard for the money to start it. In the pursuit of further wealth, each entrepreneur
either harmed workers at the company he acquired (via layoffs and benefits cuts, e.g.), or
did not. Thus, the study had a 2 (Company/Entrepreneur: ball bearings company/Taylor or
hubcap company/Simmons) X 2 (Initial Wealth Source: Inherited or Hard Work) X 2
(Harmfulness of Actions: Not Harmful or Harmful) mixed factorial experimental design
(Appendix A). The within-participants “Company/Entrepreneur” factor was included for
purposes of internal replication (Smith & Harris, 2006) and was expected and found to be
unimportant to key outcomes, as described in Results. After indicating their reactions to
the articles, participants responded to a series of individual differences questionnaires,
including one on their political ideology. Political Ideology (or, alternatively,
“Liberalism”) represented another independent variable, albeit an observed, continuous,
quasi-experimental one. As appropriate, Political Ideology’s effects were examined jointly
with the experimental manipulations. Thus, averaging participants’ responses across the
Company/Entrepreneur factor yielded a final, 2 (Source) X 2 (Harmful Actions) X
continuous (Political Ideology) between-participants design.
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Hypotheses9
Hypotheses were derived and tested. Simplified, brief rationales are provided for
each hypothesis.
Political Ideology and envy. When another has self-relevant advantages10 (Tesser,
1988; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988) that are judged to be unfair, envy often results (van
de Ven et al., 2015). In general, liberals tend to view the unequal distribution of wealth as
both objectively and subjectively less fair than do conservatives. On this basis, I predicted
there would be a positive correlation between political liberalism and state envy of the
wealthy entrepreneurs. I also expected a perhaps weaker positive correlation between
political liberalism and dispositional envy, as conservatives have a greater tendency
toward seeing the state of the world, including their own deserts, as fair (e.g., Schlenker,
Chambers, & Le, 2012).
Predicted effects of context and Political Ideology on envy and resentment.
Because of the close conceptual links between envy and resentment, I made the same
predictions about context and Political Ideology effects on resentment as envy, with the
exception of the Hard Work X Not Harmful condition, as explained below. For purposes
of brevity and clarity, hypotheses on “envy/resentment” are written together where
possible.
Both liberals and conservatives value the proportionality of economic inputs and
outputs as a basis for judging economic fairness. On this basis, I predicted a main effect of

For purposes of clarity, hypotheses are stated as though the liberal-conservative spectrum were
dichotomized, but in reality, political ideology was measured and analyzed as a continuous variable (Cohen,
Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003).
10
In the US and elsewhere, these attributes generally will include financial and professional success.
9

24

Source on envy/resentment whereby more envy/resentment would be reported in the
Inherited condition than in the Hard Work condition.
Harming others in the pursuit of wealth should seem unfair to most people across
the political spectrum. On this basis, I predicted a main effect of Harmful Actions on
envy/resentment whereby more envy/resentment would be reported in the Harmful
condition than in the Not Harmful condition.
Liberals view the unequal distribution of wealth to be more unfair than do
conservatives, whereas conservatives tend to view concentrated wealth as relatively fair
unless the possessor’s outcomes seem disproportionate to his or her inputs. Given this and
empirical research suggesting that a subjective sense of unfairness is necessary for envy,
and that liberals may be more prone to perceiving concentrated wealth as inherently and
“objectively” unfair, I predicted a main effect of Political Ideology on envy/resentment
whereby liberals would report greater envy/resentment than would conservatives in
response to wealthy entrepreneurs.
Liberals tend to be more concerned about equality of opportunity than
conservatives when making judgments about the procedural justice or fairness of another’s
outcome. On this basis, I predicted a two-way Source X Political Ideology interaction,
whereby the enhancing effect of Inherited wealth on envy/resentment would be more
pronounced among liberals than conservatives.
To an even greater extent than conservatives, liberals tend to morally evaluate
actions on the basis of how harmful and/or unfair they perceive them to be. Conservatives
often make harsher moral judgments than liberals, but given their tendency to rationalize
“collateral damage” in the current entrepreneurial capitalist system of the United States
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(e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2005), that tendency to judge perceived transgressions more
harshly may be somewhat muted when judging wealthy businesspeople. That is, due to
economic system-justifying ideologies, conservatives may see business decisions that
boost personal wealth at the expense of workers as less unfair than liberals, and therefore
less worthy of their typically-harsher moral condemnation. Despite these complexities, I
tentatively predicted a two-way Harmful Actions X Political Ideology interaction whereby
the enhancing effect of Harmful actions on envy/resentment would be more pronounced
among liberals than conservatives.
Because of differences in distributive justice concerns, I particularly expected
liberals to experience more envy than conservatives in the Hard Work X Not Harmful
condition, as that condition gave no readily apparent, “objective” reason that the
entrepreneur’s wealth was unfair. In contrast, I had no specific prediction for whether
liberals and conservatives would differ in resentment within the Hard Work X Not
Harmful condition. As shown in Figure 1, my predictions on envy in the Hard Work X
Not Harmful condition implied a simple effect of Political Ideology, such that liberals (+1
SD on political liberalism) would express greater envy in the Hard Work X Not Harmful
condition than would conservatives (-1 SD on political liberalism).
Other contextual effects on emotional reactions to wealth. Perceived harm as a
result of intentional actions should increase anger toward the actor. On this basis, I
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Figure 1: Predicted Effects of Source and Harmful Actions on Envy by Political Ideology
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predicted greater anger in the Harmful condition than in the Not Harmful condition. Moral
disgust is perhaps even more strongly linked to perceived unfairness than anger, and
should therefore be enhanced when others (a) unfairly profit at the cost of others and (b)
have unfair advantages in life. On this basis, I predicted greater moral disgust in the
Harmful condition than in the Not Harmful condition, and greater moral disgust in the
Inherited condition than in the Hard Work condition.
Predicted process effects. I conducted mediation and moderated mediation tests
in order to examine why and when liberals and conservatives might respond differently
when presented with wealthy people. These analyses focused on three key topics in the
current study, including political ideology, fairness perceptions, and envy.
Conservatives more strongly endorse economic system-justifying ideologies than
liberals, and justifying a wealthy entrepreneur’s actions (whether harmful to others or not)
should make them seem fairer. On this basis, I predicted mediation of the effect of
Political Ideology on the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions via a composite
measure of justifying statements (e.g., “Simmons’ actions were good for the overall
economy”).
The predicted moderation by Political Ideology of the effect of Source on envy
was predicated on the assumption that Liberalism would (1) enhance the effect of
Inherited wealth on envy, and (2) moderate the degree to which Inherited wealth would
lead the entrepreneur’s initial wealth source to be perceived as less fair than wealth earned
through Hard Work. On this basis, I predicted a first stage and direct effect moderation
model, in which Political Ideology moderates both the direct effect of Source on envy and
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the indirect effect of Source on envy via the perceived fairness of the initial wealth source
(Figure 2).11
The predicted moderation by Political Ideology of the effect of harm on envy was
predicated on the assumptions that Liberalism would (1) enhance the effect of Harmful
actions on envy, and (2) moderate the degree to which Harmful actions would lead the
entrepreneur’s actions to be perceived as less fair. On this basis, I predicted a first stage
and direct effect moderation model (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Hayes, 2015; Preacher,
Rucker, & Hayes, 2007), in which Political Ideology would moderate both the direct
effect of Harmful Actions on envy and the indirect effect of Harmful Actions on envy via
the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions (Figure 3).12
Exploratory analyses. I tested whether the effect of Political Ideology on the
perceived fairness of a wealthy entrepreneur’s actions would be mediated via the
perceived harmfulness of those actions, as suggested by proponents of dyadic morality
theory (DMT) (Gray & Schein, 2012; Schein & Gray, 2015). I collapsed across
experimental condition for that analysis, as the goal was to investigate in a preliminary
way whether left-right differences in moral judgments of wealthy people can be traced to
their different perceptions of how harmful a wealthy person’s behavior is likely to be.

I did not predict that the pathway between the mediator (fairness of the entrepreneur’s initial wealth
source) and the outcome (envy) would be moderated by Political Ideology. Although Liberalism should
impact the extent to which Inherited wealth (as opposed to Hard Work) decreases the perceived fairness of
that source of wealth, there was little reason to believe that the effect of such fairness judgments on envy,
once made, would be moderated by Political Ideology. In path-analytic terms, I predicted moderation of the
“a” path, but not the “b” path, in Figure 2 (see Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1176).
12
Paralleling the previously-described process model on Source and envy, I did not predict that the pathway
between the mediator (fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions) and the outcome (envy) would be moderated
by Political Ideology—although Liberalism should impact the extent to which Harmful actions decrease the
perceived fairness of those actions, there was little reason to believe that the effect of such fairness
judgments on envy, once made, would be moderated by Political Ideology. In short, I predicted moderation
of the “a” path, but not the “b” path, in Figure 3.
11
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Figure 2: Hypothesized First Stage and Direct Effect Moderation Model: Moderation by
Political Ideology of Direct Effect of Source on Envy and Indirect Effect of Source on
Envy via Perceived Fairness of Entrepreneur’s Initial Source of Wealth
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Figure 3: Hypothesized First Stage and Direct Effect Moderation Model: Moderation by
Political Ideology of Direct Effect of Harmful Actions on Envy and Indirect Effect of
Harmful Actions on Envy via Perceived Fairness of Entrepreneur’s Actions
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I also investigated whether envy varies as a function of subjective socioeconomic
status (SES) among liberals but not conservatives. Napier and Jost (2008) found that
socioeconomically disadvantaged and advantaged people do not differ in the palliative
effect of system-justifying beliefs on (un)happiness. Accordingly, because conservatives
also endorse system-justifying beliefs more strongly than liberals (Jost et al., 2003a;
Napier & Jost, 2008), they could feel less envy across the board than liberals. However, if
the envy-based, conservative account of liberal opposition to concentrated wealth is
correct, subjective SES and ideology might have interactive effects on envy in response to
a wealthy person—low SES liberals should feel more envy than high SES liberals,
whereas conservatives should feel similarly low levels of envy whether low or high in
SES. I therefore ran a multiple regression model in which envy was regressed on Political
Ideology, subjective SES, and their interaction.
Chapter Two: Method
Power Analysis
The typical effect size in published social psychology research is approximately r
= .21, or small to medium in magnitude (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003); given
this, and the small to medium effect sizes frequently observed in the pilot research, a
priori power analyses were conducted assuming small to medium effect sizes (d = .35; r =
.20; f2 = .085; Murphy & Myors, 2004). To detect an association of r = .20 (e.g., between
political liberalism and envy), 95% power required N = 319, assuming α = .05 (twotailed); with these same parameters, 80% power would require N = 193
(https://www.statstodo.com/SSizCorr_Pgm.php). For tests of the effect of a two-level
independent variable, N = 201 for 95% power and N = 121 for 80% power
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(http://powerandsamplesize.com/Calculators/Compare-2-Means/2-Sample-Equality). The
required sample size to detect mediation with 80% power using the bias-corrected
bootstrap mediation method is N = 400, assuming an “a” path medium in magnitude (e.g.,
the anticipated effect of Political Ideology on fairness judgments), and a “b” path small in
magnitude (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007, Table 3).
To calculate the sample sizes necessary for 80% power and 95% power for the
predicted three-way interaction on envy, I used G*Power version 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009). I estimated the increment in R2 as a result of adding the threeway interaction to the envy model to be .01 (f2 = .0101).13 For 80% power to detect the
predicted 3-way interaction with an increment in R2 of .01, 779 participants would be
necessary; 1,289 would be necessary for 95% power.
In past online research using mild deception similar to the deception employed in
this study (i.e., misleading people to believe that fabricated articles were genuine),
approximately 25% of participants either failed one or more attention checks or expressed
suspicion regarding the researcher-constructed articles. Given the statistical and
methodological characteristics of the proposed study (as described above), target N was

Perhaps counterintuitively, an obtained increment in R2 of .01 arguably should not be considered
negligible when one or more continuous, observed independent variables is involved. In a review article
explaining the greater difficulty of detecting interactions involving at least 1 continuous, observed
independent variable, compared to detecting interactions only involving experimentally-manipulated
independent variables, McClelland and Judd (1993) concluded that “It is not appropriate to dismiss a 1%
interaction found in the field because, as this example [of a continuous X continuous interaction discussed in
the article] shows, it is equivalent to an interaction reducing error 21.7% in an optimal design [i.e., a design
involving only experimentally-manipulated independent variables]” (p. 384). To be clear, such a large
“equivalent” reduction in error for the current study was not expected.
13
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1,000 (~800 for 80% power, plus 200 [25%] more participants to make up for anticipated
attrition).14
Participant Recruitment
Six hundred sixty-seven participants of varying socioeconomic and ethnic
backgrounds were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (or MTurk) service.
Mechanical Turk is a popular resource for recruiting participants for social science
research, as it allows researchers to quickly and inexpensively obtain data of similar
quality to data collected from convenience samples of undergraduate psychology students,
who tend to be less sociodemographically diverse (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011;
Huff & Tingley, 2015; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). In this approximately 25 minute-long
study, MTurk participants were paid 50 cents each for their participation; research
indicates that even substantially lower per-minute compensation rates have little impact on
the quality of the data MTurk participants provide (Buhrmester et al., 2011).
In addition to the MTurk sample, 321 participants were recruited from the UKY
Psychology participant pool. Data from an online mass-testing (MT) questionnaire
administered approximately 8 to 10 weeks prior to the study were available on (1) political
ideology, (2) dispositional envy, and (3) dispositional benign envy for 137 UKY
participants. Another 11 UKY participants had MT data available on only the dispositional
envy and dispositional benign envy scales. Both MTurk and UKY participants completed
the study online. Unless otherwise noted, all results are based on combined MTurk and
UKY data.

Given budgetary and time constraints that made it unlikely to obtain a sample with 95% power to detect
the three-way interaction (1,289 X 1.25 = 1,611), the target was set at 80% power, which traditionally has
been considered an acceptable level of power in social psychological research (Cohen et al., 2003).
14
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Stimulus Articles
A total of eight stimulus articles were constructed to appear as though they were
from a business website (Appendix B15).
Company/Entrepreneur manipulation. Participants read about a male
businessperson, “Gary Taylor,” who either harmed or did not harm workers in pursuit of
wealth, and either received his initial wealth as a gift from family or through hard work.
For purposes of internal replication, another businessperson, “Andy Simmons,” was also
described. Within each of the four conditions, storylines for both businesspeople were
similar, aside from superficial details which were changed to prevent the articles from
being too similar to be believable. For example, the company that each entrepreneur
acquired was in a different US state and manufactured a different product. Only a handful
of participants noted that the articles they read seemed similar to them; thus, efforts to
make the articles seem sufficiently different from one another appear to have been
successful.
(Initial Wealth) Source manipulation. The entrepreneur was presented as either
having been gifted his wealth or having earned it through long-term, sustained effort. For
example, in the Inherited condition, Gary Taylor’s backstory was described as follows:
“After Taylor graduated college at the age of twenty-one with a degree in
economics, he started working at his father’s investment management firm. The
key to the sudden take off of Taylor’s career, however, was his determination to
acquire struggling businesses, and to make sizeable profits by selling them. With

Care was taken to make the articles appear as authentic as possible. No copyediting marks (e.g., wavy
underlining) were present in the articles posted online, and few expressed the suspicion that the articles were
constructed by the researcher, or “fake.”
15
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the help of a multimillion dollar gift from his ‘well-to-do’ family, he quit his job
and started looking for a company to acquire at the ripe old age of 25.”
In the Hard Work condition, however, Taylor’s rise was described as a function of
hard work and wise investment:
“When Taylor graduated college at the age of twenty-one, he set off for the
corporate world with little more than a degree in economics and the shirt on his
back. He worked very hard at his post-college investment management job, saving
his money and making strategic stock purchases when he could. The key to the
sudden take off of Taylor’s career, however, was his determination to acquire
struggling businesses, and to make sizeable profits by selling them. By combining
his savings and selling his investments, he had just enough money to quit his job
and start looking for a company to acquire at the ripe old age of 25.”
Harmful Actions manipulation. In the Harmful condition, the entrepreneur was
portrayed as having increased the profitability of his investment in a company in ways that
decreased the economic well-being of workers. For example, participants read about
entrepreneur Andy Simmons taking the following actions in the Harmful condition:
“…he cut over 25% of the workers at the factory, and replaced them with cheaper
hires when necessary,” and “He eliminated the health insurance plans and the
401K program for all new hires, and reduced 401K matching for current
employees by 67%.”
In contrast, the entrepreneur in the Not Harmful condition increased the value of
his investment to an equal extent without harming workers in the process. To illustrate, in
the Not Harmful condition, Andy Simmons “increased the factory workers’ output with
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the help of productivity experts that he personally interviewed and hired, and designed a
new financial plan for the company.”
Questionnaires following Stimulus Articles
Following each article, participants responded to a 37-item questionnaire
(Appendix C). Responses were on a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (disagree
completely) to 6 (agree completely). Five items included as fillers to reduce suspicion
(e.g., “[Entrepreneur] is a great role model”) were not analyzed.
Envy. Five items were adapted from van de Ven et al. (2015) and averaged to
create a composite measure of envy (α = .83), including “I am a little jealous16 of
[Entrepreneur’s] wealth;” “It is frustrating that [Entrepreneur] is better off than I am;” “I
hope [Entrepreneur] suffers a serious financial setback;” “I wish [Entrepreneur] weren’t so
successful;” and “I can’t help but resent [Entrepreneur] for his success.” Although not of
central interest to the current research, “benign envy” was measured with a different set of
five items adapted from van de Ven (2015), including “I am a little envious of
[Entrepreneur]’s wealth;” “I want to have [Entrepreneur’s] wealth as well;” “I feel
inspired to get wealth myself;” “I think about what it would be like to have
[Entrepreneur’s] wealth;” and “I want to put in effort to obtain wealth myself.” The items
were averaged to create a composite measure of benign envy (α = .89).
Resentment, anger, and moral disgust. Two items were included as measures of
resentment (“I resent [Entrepreneur’s] actions/wealth”) (α = .80). Two items apiece were

In English, the terms “envy” and “jealousy” are often used interchangeably. In the psychological
literature, however, envy and jealousy are treated as distinct constructs. Specifically, jealousy is a varying
set of threatening thoughts, feelings, and action tendencies following a realization that one might lose a
valued other (e.g., a romantic partner) to another person (e.g., a rival suitor)—an inherently three-person
situation (Parrott, 1991; Parrott & Smith, 1993).
16
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also included to measure anger (“[Entrepreneur’s] actions/wealth make[s] me angry.”) (α
= .84) and moral disgust ([Entrepreneur’s] actions/wealth were/is disgusting.) (α = .88).
Manipulation checks and perceived fairness. Two items served as a
manipulation check for Source (“[Entrepreneur’s] initial wealth was earned through hard
work;” and “[Entrepreneur’s] initial wealth was given to him by family”) (α = .92) and
two items served as a manipulation check for Harmful Actions (“[Entrepreneur] harmed
the workers in the [Kansas/Ohio] company;” “[Entrepreneur] harmed the company in
[Kansas/Ohio]) (α = .84). Two items measured the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s
source capital (“The way [Entrepreneur] got his initial wealth was fair;” “[Entrepreneur]’s
source of startup money was fair”) (α = .94), and two items measured the perceived
fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions (“[Entrepreneur’s] actions were fair;”
“[Entrepreneur’s] actions with the company were unfair” (R)) (α = .93).
Economic justifications for actions. Four items measured the extent to which
participants viewed the entrepreneur’s actions as economically justified or beneficial,
including “[Entrepreneur’s] actions were good for the overall economy;” “I believe
[Entrepreneur] helped save the [Kansas/Ohio] company;” “[Entrepreneur] did his duty for
his investors by taking the actions he did with the Ohio company;” and “[Entrepreneur’s]
way of turning around companies is good for the country” (α = .91).
Personal qualities. Two items enabled an exploration of whether political
ideology might influence perceptions of the entrepreneur’s personal characteristics (e.g.,
lesser endorsement of positive attributes, and greater endorsement of negative attributes),
and, therefore emotional reactions to them. The first, “[Entrepreneur] is a very skilled
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businessperson,” gauged the entrepreneur’s perceived competence, while the second,
“[Entrepreneur] is greedy,” measured perceived greed.
Individual Differences Measures17 (Appendix D)
Political Ideology. In recent years, “Republican” has become increasingly
synonymous with conservative political ideology, just as “Democrat” has with liberal
political ideology (Barber & McCarty, 2015; Levendusky, 2009). In keeping with this
trend, and other research that has successfully used brief composite measures of political
ideology (Jost, 2006; Napier & Jost, 2008), I used a composite measure of political
ideology which combined measures of both ideology proper (i.e., endorsement of
conservative and liberal political views) and agreement with the conservative (Republican)
and liberal (Democratic) parties’ positions. This measure was an adaptation of Morgan,
Mullen, and Skitka’s (2010) measures of political orientation, which included selfreported liberalism and conservatism, as well as feelings toward Democrats and
Republicans; the items were subsequently combined to form reliable composite measures
of political orientation.
For the current research, political ideology was assessed with four items
(endpoints: 1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree): “I agree with Republicans
(Democrats) on political issues” and “I am conservative (liberal) in my political views.”
The “Republican” and “conservative” questions were reverse-scored and averaged with
the “Democrat” and “liberal” questions to obtain a composite “Liberalism” score (α =
.92). As mentioned, some participants completed the political ideology measure both as

For purposes of an unrelated scale validation project, a 7-item dispositional schadenfreude scale (Krizan &
Hoogland, manuscript in preparation) was included after all other individual differences questionnaires. This
likely prevented it from having an appreciable impact on the measures of interest in the current study and it
will not be discussed further.
17
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part of the main study session and 8-10 weeks earlier during MT, at which point the
measure was embedded among various unrelated questionnaires. Similar to when it was
administered as part of the main study session, the political ideology scale was also
reliable when administered during MT (α = .88). Moreover, test-retest reliability was high,
r(135) = .88, p < .001, indicating considerable stability of political views over the 8-10
week period between MT and participation in the main study session. Pilot data also
suggested the validity and reliability of the scale. Specifically, when a 20-item measure of
right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996) was included in the UKY Psychology
participant pool MT questionnaire, it strongly negatively correlated with this study’s
measure of Liberalism, r(1,245) = -.58, p < .001.
Dispositional hostile and benign envy. Dispositional envy was measured using
both the 8-item DES (Smith et al., 1999; example item: “It is so frustrating to see some
people succeed so easily”) (α = .91), and the 4-item dispositional malicious envy subscale
of the BeMaS (Lange & Crusius, 2015; example item: “I feel ill will towards people I
envy”) (α = .90); as expected, the scale composites were highly correlated, r(797) = .66, p
< .001. Dispositional benign envy was measured with the 4-item dispositional benign envy
subscale of the BeMaS (Lange & Crusius, 2015; example item: “If I notice that another
person is better than me, I try to improve myself”) (α = .90); there is no other validated
scale for dispositional benign envy at present. Responses to each of the above measures
were on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) in order to aid
comparability of results, and in keeping with the endpoints for the BeMaS used in
previous research (i.e., Lange & Crusius, 2015). When measured during MT, both the
dispositional envy (α = .87) and dispositional benign envy (α = .87) scales were high in
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internal consistency. Test-retest reliabilities were r(146) = .58, p < .001, and r(146) = .55,
p < .001, respectively.
Social desirability. Especially because envy is a socially undesirable emotion
(Powell, Smith, & Schurtz, 2008), I included a 13-item version of the Marlowe-Crowne
Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Fischer & Fick, 1993; Loo &
Thorpe, 2000; Reynolds, 1982) (α = .75). Responses were on a scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The SDS correlated with key outcomes, including envy
r(798) = -.23, p < .001, and liberal political ideology, r(798) = -.09, p = .011. It therefore
was included as a covariate in regression analyses to control for any influence it might
have on conservative-liberal differences on the outcomes of interest.
Subjective SES. Regardless of their actual resource level, people who perceive
themselves to be relatively low in status tend to be more supportive of redistribution (or
equality of outcomes) than those who perceive themselves to be high in status, and,
similarly, subjective socioeconomic status (SES) likely plays a greater role in reactions to
inequality than objective SES (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg, Kay, & Payne, 2015). In light
of the link between perceived status and reactions to inequality, subjective SES was
measured using the ten-rung McArthur Ladder, in which participants placed themselves at
higher rungs as their perceived standing relative to others in the United States increased
(Ditto et al., 2013).
Procedure
After signing up online and consenting to participate, participants read 2 target
articles (randomly presented), each of which was followed by questionnaires with
response options on a Likert-type scale. Participants then completed the individual
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differences measures and gave open-ended responses to the suspicion check questions.
Before exiting the study, participants read a debriefing form, which was followed by an
opportunity to withhold their data from analysis, in light of the deception employed in the
experiment.
Data Preparation
Data cleaning. Of the 321 undergraduates who consented to participate, 39 did not
indicate whether or not they consented for their data to be used; however, all but 3 of them
provided no answers for questions late in survey, indicating the vast majority of them
dropped out of the study before completion. Another 7 participants opted to have their
data excluded from analysis. Thus, 275 undergraduates’ data passed the initial data screen.
Of the 667 MTurk participants consenting to participate, 49 did not indicate whether or
not they consented for their data to be used; however, all but 1 of them did not provide
answers to questions late in survey. One other participant opted to have his or her data
excluded from analysis. Thus, 617 MTurk participants’ data passed the initial data screen.
For further data cleaning (and subsequent data analyses), the combined sample was
examined. A (2 [Sample: MTurk or UKY Undergraduate] X 4 [Experimental Condition])
chi-square test of independence confirmed that, within the combined sample, roughly
equal proportions of participants from each sample were in each experimental condition,
χ2(3) = .664, p = .88 (Table 1). This indicated that any effects of sample were not
systematically related to experimental condition and allowed the data from the MTurk and
UKY samples to be combined.
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Table 1: Participant Count by Experimental Condition and Sample (Mechanical Turk or
Undergraduate)

Sample
Count
Expected
count
% within
UKY
row
Undergraduates
% within
column
% of
Total
Count
Expected
count
% within
Mechanical
row
Turk Workers
% within
column
% of
Total
Count
Expected
count
% within
Total
row
% within
column
% of
Total

Hard
Work X
No Harm
47

Condition
Hard
Inherited
X No
Work X
Harm
Harm
50
58

Inherited
X Harm
52

Total
207

50.72

49.42

54.6

52.27

207

22.7 %

24.2 %

28.0 %

25.1 %

100.0 %

24.0 %

26.2 %

27.5 %

25.7 %

25.9 %

5.9 %

6.3 %

7.2 %

6.5 %

25.9 %

149

141

153

150

593

145.28

141.58

156.4

149.73

593

25.1 %

23.8 %

25.8 %

25.3 %

100.0 %

76.0 %

73.8 %

72.5 %

74.3 %

74.1 %

18.6 %

17.6 %

19.1 %

18.8 %

74.1 %

196

191

211

202

800

196

191

211

202

800

24.5 %

23.9 %

26.4 %

25.3 %

100.0 %

100.0 %

100.0 %

100.0 %

100.0 %

100.0 %

24.5 %

23.9 %

26.4 %

25.3 %

100.0 %
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Six participants’ data were excluded from the combined sample because they
indicated in the open-ended suspicion check questions that they accidentally skipped
ahead past an article or had technical difficulties (e.g., not seeing one of the stimulus
articles). Two participants’ data were excluded for providing rather strange answers to
those questions (“salty people who are jelly;” “us good”), thereby indicating possible
intoxication and/or not having taken the study seriously. Fifteen participants answered no
questions about either article; their data was excluded as a result. Twenty-one random
responders (e.g., participants who answered every Likert-type item in the study with a
“3”) were also excluded. A final 48 participants’ data were excluded for failing one or
both attention checks in the study (“This is an attention check. Please choose answer “3”
for this question”); one attention check was embedded in the questionnaire following each
of the two target entrepreneurs. In sum, 988 participants consented to participate, and,
after the data cleaning and exclusion procedures were completed, N = 800 (81%)
remained.
Suspicion check and sensitivity analysis. Two questions served as suspicion
checks in the study (“Do you have any comments about this study?” and “What do you
think the study was about?”). Responses were open-ended, and based on answers to both
questions, the overall suspicion of each participant was coded on an ordinal scale as
follows: 0 = None; 1 = Mild (mentioned envy, resentment, or politics); 2 = Moderate
(thought articles might have been fake); and 3 = Strong (guessed hypothesis or guessed
combination of independent variables).
Approximately 94% of participants expressed no (40%) or only mild (54%)
suspicion about the study (Table 2). Three percent expressed suspicion over the articles’
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Table 2: Suspicion by Experimental Condition
Suspicion Category
Condition
0
1
2
3
Total
Count
91
95
6
10
202
Expected count
80.55
108.3
5.55
7.58
202
Inherited X
% within row
45.0 %
47.0 %
3.0 %
5.0 % 100.0 %
Harm
% within
28.5 %
22.1 %
27.3 %
33.3 %
25.3 %
% of Total
11.4 %
11.9 %
0.8 %
1.3 %
25.3 %
Count
74
120
4
13
211
Expected count
84.14
113.1
5.8
7.91
211
Inherited X
% within row
35.1 %
56.9 %
1.9 %
6.2 % 100.0 %
No Harm
% within
23.2 %
28.0 %
18.2 %
43.3 %
26.4 %
% of Total
9.3 %
15.0 %
0.5 %
1.6 %
26.4 %
Count
77
103
7
4
191
Expected count
76.16
102.4
5.25
7.16
191
Hard Work X
% within row
40.3 %
53.9 %
3.7 %
2.1 % 100.0 %
Harm
% within
24.1 %
24.0 %
31.8 %
13.3 %
23.9 %
% of Total
9.6 %
12.9 %
0.9 %
0.5 %
23.9 %
Count
77
111
5
3
196
Expected count
78.16
105.1
5.39
7.35
196
Hard Work X
% within row
39.3 %
56.6 %
2.6 %
1.5 % 100.0 %
No Harm
% within
24.1 %
25.9 %
22.7 %
10.0 %
24.5 %
% of Total
9.6 %
13.9 %
0.6 %
0.4 %
24.5 %
Count
319
429
22
30
800
Expected count
319
429
22
30
800
Total
% within row
39.9 %
53.6 %
2.8 %
3.8 % 100.0 %
% within
100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 %
% of Total
39.9 %
53.6 %
2.8 %
3.8 % 100.0 %
Suspicion Categories: 0 = none; 1 = Mentioned envy, resentment, or politics;
2 = Suspicious of article authenticity; 3 = Guessed hypotheses/multiple independent variables
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authenticity, and 4% either guessed hypotheses and/or combinations of the independent
variables in the study. Spearman’s rho rank-order correlations indicated that participant
level of suspiciousness was not significantly associated with envy in response to the
entrepreneurs, rs (798) = -.001, p = .97, dispositional envy (measured with the
dispositional malicious envy subscale of the BeMaS), rs (798) = -.01, p = .88, either
manipulation check, |rss| < .04, ps > .30, or political orientation, rs (798) = .02, p = .63.
However, there was a weak negative correlation between social desirability and
suspiciousness, rs (798) = -.09, p = .008. Given these results indicating few differences
between the responses of suspicious and non-suspicious participants, no participant’s data
were excluded on the basis of suspicion.
Collapsing across Order and Company/Entrepreneur factors. All participants
responded to articles on entrepreneurs “Gary Taylor” and “Andy Simmons” in
counterbalanced order (Order: Taylor First, n = 391, 48.8%; Simmons First, n = 409,
52.2%). To ensure that order of presentation did not have carryover effects on responses to
the individual differences measures, a series of independent samples t-tests were
conducted with individual differences measures as the outcome and Order as the predictor.
Order did not predict responses to the political ideology, dispositional envy, and social
desirability scales, ts < 0.70, ps > .50, although a small difference was observed on
dispositional benign envy whereby participants in the Taylor First condition (M = 3.67, SD
= 1.24), scored slightly higher than participants in the Simmons First condition (M = 3.49,
SD = 1.26), t(798) = 2.03, p = .042, d = 0.14. Because only a single, modest difference
was found across the 4 tests, results for this study were collapsed across order.
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Results were also collapsed across Company/Entrepreneur (ball bearing company
buyer Gary Taylor vs. hubcap manufacturing company buyer Andy Simmons), as
participants responded to two fundamentally similar articles for purposes of internal
replication. For example, participants in the Inherited X Harmful condition read about and
responded to
two separate articles describing an entrepreneur who was gifted millions of dollars by his
family and laid off workers in the pursuit of further personal wealth.
To ensure that Company/Entrepreneur did not affect outcomes, I conducted a
series of mixed factorial ANOVAs on seven items,18 with Company/Entrepreneur as a
within-participants factor and Hard Work and Harmful as between-participants factors.
Across all the ANOVAs, there were no substantial main effects or interaction effects
involving Company/Entrepreneur, as all ηp2 values were < .01.
To further ensure that the articles about “Gary Taylor” and “Andy Simmons” were
perceived roughly equivalently, I correlated several reactions to the two entrepreneurs, and
then submitted those reactions to paired t-test analyses, with Company/Entrepreneur as the
predictor. Responses to the question “I am a little envious of [Entrepreneur]” were highly
correlated, r(791) = .68, p < .001, and responses did not differ significantly across
Company/Entrepreneur, MTaylor = 2.78, MSimmons = 2.84, t(792) = -1.07, p = .29.
Perceptions that each entrepreneur’s “source of startup money was fair” were also highly
correlated, r(786) = .72, p < .001, and nearly identical on average, MTaylor = 3.83, MSimmons
= 3.82, t(787) = 0.28, p = .78. Finally, perceptions that each entrepreneur “harmed the

The items tested were as follows: “I am a little envious of Taylor/Simmons;” “The way Taylor/Simmons
got his initial wealth was fair;” “Taylor’s/Simmons’ actions were fair;” “I resent Taylor’s/Simmons’
wealth;” “I resent Taylor’s/Simmons’ actions;” “I feel inspired to get wealth myself;” and “Taylor/Simmons
is a very skilled businessperson.”
18
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workers in the [Kansas/Ohio] company” were also highly related, r(795) = .80, p < .001,
and item means were virtually identical, MTaylor = 2.61, MSimmons = 2.60, t(796) = -0.20, p =
.84.
Given the demonstrated near-equivalence of the articles in terms of the responses
they elicited, Company/Entrepreneur was collapsed by averaging each participant’s
responses to the two entrepreneurs about whom they read. Collapsing across Order and
Company/Entrepreneur factors yielded the expected (and final) 2 (Source) X 2 (Harmful
Actions) between-participants experimental design.
Statistical Analysis
All data analyses were conducted in R version 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2013) and/or
SPSS version 22.0 (IBM Inc., 2013). Correlation, regression, and moderated regression
analyses were conducted per Cohen et al.’s (2003) guidelines using SPSS. Moderated
mediation and simple mediation analyses were conducted in SPSS with Hayes’ (2012)
PROCESS macro using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrapped resamples (cf. Preacher et al.,
2007). Simple slopes tests were conducted in R.
Modeling envy and resentment. I separately modeled envy and resentment with
contrast-coded Source (-.5 = Inherited, .5 = Hard Work) and Harmful Actions (-.5 = Not
Harmful, .5 = Harmful) as binary predictors, and mean-centered Liberalism and social
desirability (a covariate) as continuous predictors. I initially included all possible
interaction terms (e.g., the 4-way interaction), per Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd (2004), who
argued that, in order to prevent biased estimation of regression coefficients for interaction
effects of theoretical interest, all possible IV X covariate interactions should be included
in multiple regression models. Yzerbyt et al. (2004) further noted that under some
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circumstances failure to include a non-significant IV x covariate interaction could lead to
false-positive results on the interaction effect(s) of theoretical interest. However, Hayes
(2012) reasoned that while IV X covariate interactions should indeed be tested, such terms
can be dropped when they are (1) not statistically significant, and (2) when they were not
predicted a priori. Accordingly, I dropped the IV X covariate interactions from the models
for both envy and resentment, as (1) all p-values for those tests were ≥ .15 and (2) I had
not predicted any IV X covariate interactions. Thus, reported results include main effects
tests of the 3 IVs and the covariate (i.e., Source, Harmful Actions, Liberalism, and social
desirability), and all possible interactions among the 3 IVs.
I also checked regression model assumptions and found “fanning”
heteroskedasticity of residuals (Cohen et al., 2003).19 Thus, I also ran the envy and
resentment models using heteroskedasticity-consistent HC3 and HC4m standard errors
estimators, which keep Type-I error rates very near nominal levels in the presence of
heteroskedasticity; the latter estimator also adjusts for high leverage points (Cribari-Neto
& da Silva, 2011; Hayes & Cai, 2007). Using these estimators yielded significance test
results very similar to those using regular OLS standard errors. Regression results reported
in-text are based on HC4m standard error estimators. For comparison purposes, results
using standard OLS and HC3 standard error estimators are also summarized in the
regression tables for envy and resentment.

There was also non-normality of residuals in both models, but given the large sample size, this was
considered a negligible issue (Cohen et al., 2003). Bivariate scatterplots did not reveal any non-linear
patterns of association.
19
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Chapter Three: Results
Descriptive Statistics
Participants (N = 800) were primarily female (n = 509, 63.6%) and predominantly
Caucasian (n = 688, 86.0%). Sixty-seven (8.4%) participants indicated they were African
American and 33 (4.1%) indicated they were Asian American; 46 people of any race
(5.8%) indicated Hispanic ethnicity (Table 3). The sample was somewhat less
homogeneous in terms of age, subjective SES, and political ideology (Table 4).
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 87 years old (M = 33.70, SD = 14.46), and most
participants placed themselves near the middle of the subjective SES scale (M = 4.68, SD
= 1.73). Overall, the sample tended to lean slightly liberal (M = 3.21, SD = 1.22).
Across conditions, participants tended to report only modest amounts of envy,
resentment, anger, and moral disgust (Table 5), but this was expected, in part because of
the emotions’ social undesirability. Such results were also in keeping with previous
research on envy and related emotions (Smith & Kim, 2007). However, participants did
report higher levels of all four of these negative emotions in the Harmful conditions.
Conversely, actions were considered to be fairer in the Not Harmful than the Harmful
conditions. Finally, the entrepreneur’s source of initial wealth was considered to be fairer
in the Hard Work than the Inherited conditions.
Negative emotional reactions to the wealthy entrepreneurs tended to be strongly
correlated, although the correlations between those emotions and the fairness measures
tended to be somewhat lower (Table 620). Descriptively, the emotion most strongly

In Tables 6 and 7, both Pearson’s r and Kendall’s Tau-b non-parametric correlations are provided, as
some variables were heavily skewed. Results were similar whether using Pearson’s r or Kendall’s Tau-b,
although the non-parametric correlations tended to be slightly smaller in magnitude.
20
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Table 3: Gender, Race, and Ethnicity
Gender
n
%
Female
509
63.6%
Male
286
35.8%
Prefer Not to Answer
5
0.6%
Total
800
100.0%
Race
n
%
688
Caucasian
86.0%
African American
67
8.4%
Asian American
33
4.1%
Native American
10
1.3%
Two or More Races
16
2.0%
Other/Prefer Not to Answer
19
2.4%
†
Total
833
104.1%
Ethnicity
n
%
Hispanic (of Any Race)
46
5.8%
Not Hispanic
733
91.6%
Prefer Not to Answer
21
2.6%
Total
800
100.0%
†Percentage sums to over 100% because some participants indicated multiple
races
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Table 4: Demographic Statistics
Demographic Variable
Age
Subjective SES (1-9
scale)
Liberalism (1-5 scale)

Percentile
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
19
20
31
43
57
62

M
SD
33.7 14.46

5%
18

4.68
3.21

2
2
3
5
6
7
7
1.00 1.25 2.25 3.25 4.25 5.00 5.00

1.73
1.22
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Table 5: Descriptives Statistics by Experimental Condition
Outcome
(0-6 scale)
Envy

Resentment

Anger

Moral
Disgust
Fairness of
Harmful
Actions
Fairness of
Initial
Wealth
Source

Source
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work
Inherited
Hard Work

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Harmful
Actions
Not Harmful
Not Harmful
Harmful
Harmful
Not Harmful
Not Harmful
Harmful
Harmful
Not Harmful
Not Harmful
Harmful
Harmful
Not Harmful
Not Harmful
Harmful
Harmful
Not Harmful
Not Harmful
Harmful
Harmful
Not Harmful
Not Harmful
Harmful
Harmful
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n
211
196
202
191
211
196
202
191
211
196
202
191
211
196
202
191
211
196
202
191
211
196
202
191

M
1.38
1.30
2.03
1.93
1.18
0.97
2.52
2.40
0.84
0.81
2.52
2.53
0.86
0.81
2.62
2.65
4.70
4.95
2.51
2.60
3.61
4.64
3.01
3.99

Mdn
1.10
1.10
2.00
1.80
1.00
0.50
2.50
2.50
0.25
0.25
2.50
2.50
0.50
0.25
2.62
2.50
4.75
5.00
2.50
2.75
3.50
5.00
3.00
4.00

SD
1.11
1.10
1.41
1.31
1.23
1.22
1.60
1.56
1.12
1.12
1.69
1.70
1.06
1.14
1.76
1.77
1.05
1.06
1.66
1.56
1.47
1.23
1.58
1.38
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2
0.004
—

2
0.004
—

1 Source
—
2 Harmful Actions
3 Liberalism
4 Social Desirability
5 Envy
6 Benign Envy
7 Resentment
8 Anger
9 Moral Disgust
10 Fairness of Actions
11 Fairness of Initial Wealth Source
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

1

1 Source
—
2 Harmful Actions
3 Liberalism
4 Social Desirability
5 Envy
6 Benign Envy
7 Resentment
8 Anger
9 Moral Disgust
10 Fairness of Actions
11 Fairness of Initial Wealth Source
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

1

5
-0.034
0.249 ***
0.216 ***
-0.229 ***
—

Pearson's r
6
0.035
-0.213 ***
-0.124 ***
-0.129 ***
0.088 *
—

Kendall's Tau-b
3
4
5
6
0.023 0.018
-0.022
0.035
0.006 -0.007
0.198 *** -0.167 ***
— -0.07 ** 0.146 *** -0.089 ***
—
-0.164 *** -0.099 ***
—
0.054 *
—

3
4
0.023 0.014
0.006 -0.001
— -0.089 *
—

7
-0.047
0.381 ***
0.175 ***
-0.099 ***
0.588 ***
-0.187 ***
—

7
-0.049
0.441 ***
0.246 ***
-0.139 ***
0.783 ***
-0.225 ***
—

Table 6: Correlations among Predictors and Reactions to Wealthy Entrepreneurs

8
-0.005
0.449 ***
0.163 ***
-0.088 ***
0.54 ***
-0.236 ***
0.745 ***
—

8
-0.002
0.511 ***
0.238 ***
-0.11 **
0.718 ***
-0.309 ***
0.872 ***
—

9
-0.01
0.455 ***
0.163 ***
-0.067 **
0.485 ***
-0.29 ***
0.722 ***
0.816 ***
—

9
-0.002
0.524 ***
0.238 ***
-0.082 *
0.635 ***
-0.388 ***
0.831 ***
0.925 ***
—

10
0.042
-0.542 ***
-0.118 ***
0.039
-0.308 ***
0.338 ***
-0.562 ***
-0.654 ***
-0.674 ***
—

10
0.045
-0.641 ***
-0.176 ***
0.044
-0.415 ***
0.469 ***
-0.687 ***
-0.791 ***
-0.817 ***
—

11
0.288 ***
-0.165 ***
-0.105 ***
0.049
-0.221 ***
0.263 ***
-0.342 ***
-0.359 ***
-0.369 ***
0.398 ***
—

11
0.326 ***
-0.2 ***
-0.165 ***
0.066
-0.296 ***
0.361 ***
-0.416 ***
-0.449 ***
-0.468 ***
0.512 ***
—

correlated with judgments of (un)fairness was moral disgust, which was not surprising,
given mounting research indicating that moral disgust may be particularly closely linked
to perceived unfairness (e.g., Chapman et al., 2009).
Manipulation Checks and Perceived Fairness
Results indicated that the Source and Harmful Actions manipulations were
successful. Hard Work condition entrepreneurs were much more strongly perceived as
having earned their initial capital through hard work (M = 4.66, SD = 1.21) than
entrepreneurs in the Inherited condition (M = 1.56, SD = 1.47), t(798) = 32.58, p < .001, d
= 2.31. Participants also perceived that Harmful condition entrepreneurs harmed others
(M = 3.44, SD = 1.44) much more than did entrepreneurs in the Not Harmful condition
(M = 1.15, SD = 1.16), t(798) = 24.73, p < .001, d = 1.75.
As expected, the way in which Inherited condition entrepreneurs obtained their
initial wealth (i.e., as a gift from family) was considered less fair (M = 3.32, SD = 1.55)
than the way in which Hard Work condition entrepreneurs obtained their initial wealth
(i.e., through sustained hard work) (M = 4.32, SD = 1.34), t(798) = -9.74, p < .001, d = 0.69. In a similar vein, Harmful condition entrepreneurs’ actions were considered much
less fair (M = 2.56, SD = 1.61) than those of the Not Harmful condition entrepreneurs (M
= 4.82, SD = 1.06), t(798) = -23.59, p < .001, d = -1.69.
Envy and Liberalism
Correlation analyses were performed on measures of Political Ideology and both
state and dispositional envy to address whether liberals might be more envy-prone than
conservatives. As predicted, state envy of the wealthy entrepreneurs was positively
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associated with Liberalism, whether Liberalism was measured concurrently, r(798) = .22,
p < .001, or weeks earlier during MT, r(135) = .17, p = .050.21
When measured concurrently, Liberalism was significantly positively associated
with dispositional envy, whether measured with the DES (Smith et al., 1999), r(797) =
.11, p = .002, or the Dispositional Malicious Envy subscale of the BeMaS (Lange &
Crusius, 2015), r(798) = .17, p < .001. However, when Liberalism was measured during
MT, there was not a significant association between Liberalism and dispositional envy,
rDES (135) = .02, p = .79; rBeMaS (135) = .11, p = .20. When measured concurrently,
Liberalism was significantly negatively correlated with dispositional benign envy, r(798)
= -.07, p = .040. However, when Liberalism was measured during MT, there was not a
significant association between Liberalism and dispositional benign envy, r(135) = -.11,
p = .22.
In summary, associations between Liberalism and state envy of the entrepreneurs
were both more consistent and stronger in magnitude than associations between
Liberalism and dispositional envy. This was also the case with state and dispositional
benign envy (Table 7).
Envy
Regression results for envy (Table 8) indicated no significant main effect of
Source (i.e., Inherited or earned through Hard Work), b = -0.09, SEHC4m = 0.08, t = -1.11,
p = .27. There were, however, significant main effects of Harmful Actions (i.e., Not

When measured concurrently, Liberalism was significantly positively associated with dispositional envy,
r(798) = .25, p < .001. In contrast, when Liberalism was measured during MT, there was not a significant
association between Liberalism and state resentment, r(135) = .11, p = .22. State benign envy was
negatively associated with Liberalism, whether Liberalism was measured concurrently, r(798) = -.12, p <
.001, or weeks earlier during MT, r(135) = -.19, p = .025.
21
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2
3
0.15 *** -0.09 ***
—
0.054 *
—

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

1 Liberal
2 Envy
3 Benign Envy
4 Disp. Malicious Envy
5 Disp. Envy
6 Disp. Benign Envy
7 Social Desirability
8 Fairness of Actions
9 Fairness of Initial Wealth Source
10 MT Liberal
11 MT Disp. Benign Envy
12 MT Disp. Malicious Envy

1
—

1
2
3
1 Liberal
—
0.22 *** -0.12 ***
2 Envy
—
0.088 *
3 Benign Envy
—
4 Disp. Malicious Envy
5 Disp. Envy
6 Disp. Benign Envy
7 Social Desirability
8 Fairness of Actions
9 Fairness of Initial Wealth Source
10 MT Liberal
11 MT Disp. Benign Envy
12 MT Disp. Malicious Envy
4
0.11 ***
0.5 ***
0.07 **
—

4
0.17 ***
0.65 ***
0.13 ***
—

Kendall's Tau-b
5
6
0.05 *
-0.05
0.43 *** 0.102 ***
0.16 *** 0.409 ***
0.51 *** 0.138 ***
—
0.175 ***
—

5
0.11
0.55
0.23
0.66
—

Pearson's r
6
**
-0.07 *
*** 0.153 ***
*** 0.579 ***
*** 0.202 ***
0.235 ***
—

Table 7: Correlations among Liberalism, Envy, and Fairness Judgments

7
-0.07
-0.16
-0.1
-0.27
-0.26
-0.07
—

7
-0.09
-0.23
-0.13
-0.35
-0.35
-0.11
—

8
9
** -0.12 *** -0.11
*** -0.31 *** -0.22
*** 0.338 *** 0.263
*** -0.17 *** -0.15
***
-0.1 *** -0.09
** 0.101 *** 0.097
0.039
0.049
—
0.398
—

10
*** 0.772 ***
*** 0.126 *
*** -0.1
*** 0.07
*** -0.02
*** -0.1
0.019
*** -0.17 **
-0.14 *
—

8
9
10
*
-0.18 *** -0.17 *** 0.88 ***
*** -0.42 ***
-0.3 *** 0.168 *
*** 0.469 *** 0.361 *** -0.19 *
*** -0.18 *** -0.18 *** 0.11
***
-0.1 **
-0.09 *
0.023
** 0.144 *** 0.14 *** -0.11
0.044
0.066
0.041
—
0.512 *** -0.24 **
—
-0.21 *
—

11
0.038
0.037
0.099
0.078
0.047
0.348 ***
-0.12 *
0.044
0.037
0.005
—

11
0.028
0.1
0.168 *
0.077
0.062
0.551 ***
-0.16
0.016
0.059
-0.01
—

12
0.038
0.225 ***
0.108
0.424 ***
0.308 ***
0.115
-0.23 ***
0.076
0.067
0.041
0.204 ***
—

12
0.081
0.307 ***
0.159
0.578 ***
0.442 ***
0.148
-0.37 ***
0.095
0.075
0.076
0.245 **
—

Table 8: Regular OLS and Heteroskedasticity-Robust Regression Models on Envy
Envy
Regular OLS SE
Robust HC3 SE
Robust HC4m SE
1.66 [1.58, 1.74]*** 1.66 [1.58, 1.74]*** 1.66 [1.58, 1.74]***
-0.09 [-0.26, 0.07]
-0.09 [-0.26, 0.07]
-0.09 [-0.26, 0.07]

Intercept
Source (Inherited = -.5,
Hard Work = .5)
Harmful (Not Harmful = 0.64 [0.47, 0.80]*** 0.64 [0.47, 0.80]*** 0.64 [0.47, 0.80]***
-.5, Harmful = .5)
Liberal
0.20 [0.14, 0.27]*** 0.20 [0.14, 0.27]*** 0.20 [0.14, 0.27]***
-0.09 [-0.11, -0.09 [-0.11, -0.09 [-0.11, Social Desirability
0.06]***
0.06]***
0.06]***
Source X Harmful
0.06 [-0.27, 0.39]
0.06 [-0.27, 0.39]
0.06 [-0.27, 0.39]
Source X Liberal
0.12 [-0.01, 0.26]†
0.12 [-0.01, 0.25]†
0.12 [-0.01, 0.25]†
Harmful X Liberal
0.03 [-0.10, 0.16]
0.03 [-0.10, 0.16]
0.03 [-0.10, 0.16]
Source X Harmful X
-0.07 [-0.34, 0.20]
-0.07 [-0.33, 0.19]
-0.07 [-0.33, 0.19]
Liberal
N
800
2
R
0.157
2
Adjusted R
0.149
Residual SE
1.178
***
F(8, 791) = 18.464
NOTE: Bracketed values are lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals of the
regression estimates
†
p < .10, *p < .05, **p < 0.01, ***p < .001
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Harmful or Harmful), b = 0.64, SEHC4m = 0.08, t = 7.58, p < .001; Liberalism, b = 0.20,
SEHC4m = 0.03, t = 5.96, p < .001; and social desirability, b = -0.09, SEHC4m = 0.01, t = 6.08, p < .001. The only interaction term that approached significance was Source X
Liberalism, b = 0.12, SEHC4m = 0.07, t = 1.81, p = .071; all other ps > .42.
I probed the Source X Liberalism interaction on envy to determine whether the
enhancing effect of Inherited wealth on envy would be greater among liberals than
conservatives, thereby confirming my hypothesis. However, the opposite was the case.
Specifically, a Johnson-Neyman regions of significance analysis22 indicated that there
was no significant effect (at p < .05) of Source on envy among people greater than 2.57
(i.e., slightly below the midpoint) on the Liberalism scale. That is, Inherited wealth only
strengthened envy compared to wealth earned through Hard Work among those who were
at least slightly conservative (Figure 4). It should be noted, however, that simple slopes
tests indicated liberals (+1 SD Liberalism) experienced significantly more envy than
conservatives (-1 SD Liberalism) in both the Hard Work (p < .001) and Inherited (p =
.004) conditions. Even so, per the significant interaction effect, the effect of Liberalism
on envy was stronger in the Hard Work condition than in the Inherited condition.
A planned comparison confirmed the prediction that there would be a significant
difference between conservatives (-1 SD on Liberalism) and liberals (+1 SD on
Liberalism) on envy within the Hard Work X Not Harmful condition. Liberals (estimated
mean = 1.60, SE = .12) reported more envy than conservatives (estimated mean = 0.95,
SE = .12) in the Hard Work X Not Harmful condition, t(791) = 3.96, p < .001, d = .28.

This and all other probes of moderation, mediation, or moderated mediation effects were performed in
PROCESS using HC3 heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimators.
22
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Estimated Envy

Figure 4: Effect of Source on Envy Moderated by Political Ideology (Estimated Means at
-1 SD, M, and +1 SD Liberalism)
2
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1

Conservative

Moderate
Hard Work

Liberal
Inherited

60

Resentment
Regression results for resentment (Table 9) indicated a marginally significant
main effect of Source, b = -0.17, SEHC4m = 0.10, t = -1.75, p = .081. Significant main
effects of resentment were obtained on Harmful Actions, b = 1.39, SEHC4m = 0.10, t =
14.46, p < .001; Liberalism, b = 0.30, SEHC4m = 0.04, t = 7.55, p < .001; and social
desirability, b = -0.059, SEHC4m = 0.02, t = -3.67, p < .001. Contrary to predictions, no
interaction effects approached significance, ps ≥ .154.
Although I had no a priori hypothesis about whether liberals would report more
resentment in the Hard Work X Not Harmful condition than conservatives, I conducted a
contrast analysis to determine whether results on resentment would mirror those on envy.
Closely paralleling results on envy, liberals indicated more resentment (estimated mean =
1.30, SE = .13) of Hard Work X Not Harmful condition entrepreneurs than conservatives
in the same experimental condition (estimated mean = 0.60, SE = .14), t(791) = 3.74, p <
.001, d = .27.
Context Effects on other Emotions
Context was also predicted to exert effects on emotions other than envy and
resentment, including anger and moral disgust. As expected, participants experienced
greater anger in the Harmful condition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.69) than in the Not Harmful
condition (M = 0.83, SD = 1.12), t(798) = 16.80, p < .001, d = 1.19, and greater moral
disgust was also indicated in the Harmful condition (M = 2.64, SD = 1.76) than in the Not
Harmful condition (M = 1.10, SD = 0.05), t(798) = 17.37, p < .001, d = 1.29. On the other
hand, there was virtually no difference in moral disgust between the Inherited (M = 1.73,
SD = 1.69) and Hard Work (M = 1.72, SD = 1.75) conditions, t(798) = 0.07, p = .95, d =
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Table 9: Regular OLS and Heteroskedasticity-Robust Regression Models on Resentment
Resentment
Regular OLS SE
Robust HC3 SE
Robust HC4m SE
Intercept
1.77 [1.67, 1.86]*** 1.77 [1.67, 1.86]*** 1.77 [1.67, 1.86]***
Source (Inherited = -.5, -0.17 [-0.35, 0.02]† -0.17 [-0.36, 0.02]† -0.17 [-0.36, 0.02]†
Hard Work = .5)
Harmful (Not Harmful 1.39 [1.20, 1.57]*** 1.39 [1.20, 1.57]*** 1.39 [1.20, 1.57]***
= -.5, Harmful = .5)
Liberal
0.30 [0.22, 0.38]*** 0.30 [0.22, 0.38]*** 0.30 [0.22, 0.38]***
-0.06 [-0.09, -0.06 [-0.09, -0.06 [-0.09, Social Desirability
0.03]***
0.03]***
0.03]***
Source X Harmful
0.15 [-0.22, 0.53]
0.15 [-0.22, 0.53]
0.15 [-0.22, 0.53]
Source X Liberal
0.05 [-0.10, 0.20]
0.05 [-0.10, 0.20]
0.05 [-0.10, 0.20]
Harmful X Liberal
0.11 [-0.04, 0.26]
0.11 [-0.04, 0.26]
0.11 [-0.04, 0.26]
Source X Harmful X -0.09 [-0.39, 0.22] -0.09 [-0.39, 0.22] -0.09 [-0.39, 0.22]
Liberal
N
800
2
R
0.27
2
Adjusted R
0.27
Residual SE
1.35
***
F(8, 791) = 37.26
NOTE: Bracketed values are lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals of
the regression estimates
†
p < .10, *p < .05, **p < 0.01, ***p < .001
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.01, disconfirming my hypothesis. Perhaps moral disgust is more likely in response to
more clear-cut examples of unfairness than having received a large sum of money from
family, such as blatantly harming others in the pursuit of personal gain.
Process Models
Justifications for actions and fairness. As predicted, the effect of liberal
political ideology on the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions was mediated
via decreased endorsement of justifications for the entrepreneur’s actions, b = -0.25, 95%
CI [-0.33, -0.17]; no significant direct effect remained after taking into account the
indirect effect, p = .96 (Figure 5). The model accounted for a very large proportion of
variance in fairness judgments, R2 = .69, p < .001. Because of the strong link between
justifications and fairness, b = 1.06, p < .001, a follow-up exploratory serial mediation
analysis including mediation pathways from (1) LiberalismJustificationsEnvy, (2)
LiberalismFairness of ActionsEnvy, and (3) LiberalismJustificationsFairness of
ActionsEnvy was conducted to explore how those variables might be related to
ideology-based differences in envy (Figure 6). Significant effects via pathways (1), b =
0.05, 95% CI [0.02, 0.08], and (3), b = 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.07] were obtained, and the
model explained approximately one quarter of the variance in envy, R2 = .25, p < .001.
Accounting for all indirect pathways, a significant direct effect of Liberalism on envy
remained, b = 0.12, 95% CI [0.05, 0.19]. The ratio of the indirect effect to the total effect
of Liberalism on envy was .41, 95% CI [.26, .64].
This pattern suggests that conservatives may have perceived the actions wealthy
entrepreneurs took in pursuit of more wealth as more justifiable and fair than liberals did,
helping to explain why they reacted to the wealthy entrepreneurs with somewhat less

63

Figure 5: Mediation of Effect of Political Ideology on Fairness of Actions via
Endorsement of Justifications for Actions

NOTE: Indirect effect of Liberalism on perceived fairness of actions via
endorsement of justifications for actions: ab = -0.25, 95% CI [-0.33, -0.17]
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Figure
6: Effect on Political Ideology on Envy Serial Multiple Mediation Model
Fairness

Indirect effect of Liberalism on Envy through Justifications for Actions
= a1b1 = 0.05, 95% CI [.02, .08]
Indirect effect of Liberalism on Envy through Perceived Fairness of Actions
= a2b2 = -0.0002, 95% CI [-.01, .01], ns
Indirect effect of Liberalism on Envy through Justifications for Actions and
Perceived Fairness of Actions in serial = a1d21b2 = 0.04, 95% CI [.01, .07]
Direct effect of Liberalism on Envy = c’ = 0.12, 95% CI [.05, .19]
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envy than liberals. However, there are plausible alternative explanations for the obtained
pattern, especially because the lack of a time lag between the mediators in the serial
mediation model makes causal precedence unclear.
Source, fairness of initial wealth, and envy. I predicted that (1) Liberalism
would moderate the direct effect of Source on the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s
initial wealth source, and (2) Liberalism would moderate the mediated effect of Source
on Envy via the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s initial wealth source. This
predicted model received partial support (Figure 7). Although Liberalism did not
moderate the mediated effect of Source on envy via fairness of initial wealth, b = -.01,
95% CI [-0.05, 0.03], Liberalism marginally-significantly moderated the direct effect of
Source on envy, b = 0.12, p = .076. The marginally significant direct effect of Source on
envy was also positive, b = 0.14, p = .099. Probing the interaction revealed that after
accounting for the envy-reducing indirect effect of Source via fairness of initial wealth (b
= -.23, p < .001), there was no significant effect of Source on envy among relatively
conservative participants. Surprisingly, however, Hard Work entrepreneurs engendered
somewhat more envy than Inherited wealth entrepreneurs among people politically left of
center (Figure 8).
In seeking to better understand the current model, it might first be noted that the
envy-reducing indirect effect of Source on envy via increased perceived fairness of initial
wealth was essentially identical across all levels of Liberalism. This was evidenced by the
lack of moderated mediation and the very similar magnitude of the indirect effect among
participants across the political spectrum (e.g., b = -.22 and b = -.24 for those at the 10th
and 90th percentiles of Liberalism, respectively). Thus, results suggested knowing that a
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=
Figure
7: Direct Effect of Source on Envy Moderated by Political Ideology
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Figure 8: Conditional Direct Effect of Source on Envy at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th
Percentiles of Liberalism
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NOTE: Dashed line indicates non-significant (p > .10) direct effect of Source on envy.
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wealthy person’s initial wealth was earned through Hard Work (as opposed to having
been Inherited) may have had similar palliative effects on liberals’ and conservatives’
envy. Even so, certain perceived personal qualities of the Hard Work entrepreneur may
have stoked liberals’ envy beyond any envy-reducing effect his Algeresque story had via
increased perceived fairness of his initial wealth. To begin to address this possibility, I
explored whether Source would moderate the effects of Liberalism on perceived
competence and greed, as perceived competence and greed were both associated with
envy in the current study, rcompetence = -.34,23 rgreed = .49, ps < .001. Results of moderated
regression analyses indicated that Source did not moderate the significant effects of
Liberalism on perceived competence and greed. That is, across Source conditions,
Liberalism was associated with viewing wealthy entrepreneurs as less competent (b = 0.15, p < .001) and more greedy (b = 0.35, p < .001), and there was no significant Source
X Liberalism interaction on competence and greed, ps > .54. Given these results, a
relatively simple explanation for the model represented in Figures 7 and 8 seems
possible, if not likely: because liberals tended to experience more envy in general, they
had more envy left over to explain after taking into account the mediated effect of the
Source manipulation via the perceived fairness of the initial wealth.
Harmful Actions, fairness of actions, and envy. Political Ideology was
predicted to moderate (1) the direct effect of Harmful Actions on envy, and (2) the

Finding a negative correlation between perceived competence and envy may seem counterintuitive, as
competence makes another person more “enviable,” at least in a colloquial sense. However, given the close
link between perceived unfairness and envy, a negative association between competence and envy actually
makes sense—a more competent wealthy person is likely to be perceived as more deserving of his or her
professional and financial success than a relatively less competent wealthy person. Still, in keeping with the
intuitive idea that perceiving another to be more competent is likely to make him or her more “enviable,”
non-hostile, benign envy was positively associated with perceived competence, r(798) = .40, p < .001.
These findings once again underscore the crucial role of the perceived justice and fairness of outcomes in
the experience of envy (Smith & Kim, 2007; Floyd, Hoogland, & Smith, 2015; Hoogland et al., in press).
23
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indirect of Harmful Actions on envy via the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s
actions. Results provided partial support for the predicted model (Figure 9). Although
Liberalism did not moderate the direct effect of Harmful Actions on envy, b = -0.05, p =
.43, it did moderate the mediated effect of Harmful Actions on envy via the perceived
fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions, per the significant index of moderated mediation,24
b = .08, SE = .02, 95% CI [.04, .13]. As illustrated in Figure 10, the more liberal a
participant was, the more strongly harming workers (i.e., the Harmful condition)
increased their envy by way of decreasing the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s
actions.
Exploratory Analyses
Perceived harm’s link to fairness judgments. I explored whether increases in
the perceived harmfulness of actions might determine the perceived unfairness of those
actions, as posited by proponents of dyadic morality theory (DMT) (e.g., Schein & Gray,
2015), and how such a process might help explain differences in envy between
conservatives and liberals. I conducted a simple mediation analysis (Figure 11) with
Liberalism as the predictor, the perceived harmfulness of the entrepreneur’s actions as the
mediator, and the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions as the outcome. In
keeping with DMT, results indicated that no significant direct effect of Liberalism on the
perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions remained after taking into account the
indirect effect of Liberalism via harm perceptions, bdirect effect = -0.02, p = .54; bindirect effect =
-0.23, 95% CI [-0.32, -0.15]. Taken together with Liberalism’s strengthening of the
mediated effect of Harmful Actions on envy via the perceived fairness of the
A significant index of moderated mediation indicates that the moderator moderates the mediated effect
throughout the moderator’s range of values (for a review, see Hayes, 2015).
24
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Figure 9: Moderation by Political Ideology of Indirect Effect of Harmful Actions on
Envy via Perceived Fairness of Entrepreneur’s Actions

NOTES: Index of moderated mediation: b = .08, SE = .02, 95% CI [.04, .13],
Conditional indirect effect of Harmful Actions on envy via perceived fairness
of entrepreneur’s actions: ω = a1b1 + a3b1W = .6328 + .0795(mean-centered
Liberalism)

71

Figure 10: Conditional Indirect Effect of Harmful Actions on Envy via Perceived
Fairness of Actions at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th Percentiles of Liberalism

Mediated Effect of Harmful Actions on Envy via
Perceived Fairness of Actions

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

Liberalism (1-5 scale)

NOTE: Index of moderated mediation: b = .08, SE = .02, 95% CI [.04, .13],
Conditional indirect effect: ω = a1b1 + a3b1W = .6328 + .0795(mean-centered
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Liberalism scores on x-axis were transformed to original scale for ease of interpretation.
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Figure 11: Test of Mediation of Effect of Political Ideology on Perceived Fairness of
Actions via Perceived Harmfulness of Actions
R2 = .04, p < .001
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NOTE: Indirect effect of Liberalism on perceived fairness of actions via perceived
harmfulness: ab = -0.23, 95% CI [-0.32, -0.15]
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entrepreneur’s actions (per the previous subsection), these results suggest that liberals
may perceive entrepreneurs’ actions as more harmful, and therefore unfair, than
conservatives, ultimately leading to enhanced envy of them. This raises the question of
whether such liberal-conservative differences in harm and fairness perceptions were
present only in the Harmful condition, especially since there was no clear indication that
the entrepreneurs in the Not Harmful condition had harmed anyone.
Subsetting and analyzing the data by Harmful condition (i.e., Harmful or Not
Harmful) indicated that Liberalism was associated with the perceived harm done by and
fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions within both the Harmful condition, rharmfulness(391) =
.36, p < .001, rfairness(391) = -.30, p < .001, and the Not Harmful condition (albeit more
weakly), rharmfulness(405) = .12, p = .017, rfairness(405) = -.12, p = .021. The difference
between the correlations observed in the two conditions was significant for both
perceived harm, Z = 3.61, p < .001, and perceived fairness, Z = -2.66, p = .004. Thus,
ideology-based differences in perceived harmfulness and associated (un)fairness
judgments are especially pronounced when harm clearly has been done, but such
differences are also present to a lesser extent when no direct indication of harm-doing
exists. While Liberalism most strongly enhances perceived harm when harm clearly has
been done (per liberals’ greater endorsement of Harm and Fairness as foundations for
moral judgments), relative to conservatives, liberals also appear less likely to give
wealthy people who have not necessarily harmed anyone the benefit of the doubt. In
keeping with this line of reasoning, although Liberalism was more strongly associated
with perceived greed within the Harmful condition, r(391) = .32, p < .001, it was also
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associated with greed perceptions in the Not Harmful condition, r(405) = .18, p < .001, Z
= 2.11, p = .035.
Do downscale liberals envy wealthy people significantly more than upscale
liberals? Envy-based, conservative explanations of liberal opposition to concentrated
wealth suggest that liberals should feel more envy when they are low rather than high in
SES, while conservatives across the socioeconomic spectrum should feel similar, low
levels of envy. However, I did not find evidence that the conservative-liberal gap in envy
varied as a function of subjective SES, although subjective SES had weak zero-order
correlations with both liberal political ideology, r(749) = -.11, p = .002, and envy, r(749)
= -.07, p = .046. As illustrated in Figure 12, in a model including subjective SES,
Liberalism, and their interaction as predictors of envy (and social desirability as a
covariate), only Liberalism, b = 0.18, p < .001, and social desirability, b = -0.08, p < .001,
were significantly associated with envy. In short, Liberalism’s link to envy was not
significantly stronger or weaker among participants at the high vs. low ends of the
socioeconomic spectrum.
Chapter Four: Discussion
This study set out to begin answering a number of questions on “the politics of
envy,” including whether, other things being equal, liberals are more prone to envy than
conservatives. The tentative answer to that question would appear to be a qualified
“Yes,” but the observed links were weak, and it was telling that political liberalism was
more strongly associated with reactions to specific, wealthy entrepreneurs than with a
general disposition toward envying anyone, be they coworkers from the office or wealthy
CEOs. That is, liberals appear to be only slightly more prone to envy than conservatives,
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Figure 12: Test of Moderation by Political Ideology of Effect of Subjective SES on Envy
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R2 = .08, p < .001

Envy

but such differences become somewhat more pronounced when faced with people whose
wealth and backstories evoke fairness and justice concerns.
Competing conservative and liberal narratives about opposition to concentrated
wealth and income inequality largely hinge on the question of whether envy or fairness
concerns underlie that opposition. Conservative critics contend that opposition to great
wealth is based in envy of wealthy people’s successes, rather than the more sociallylegitimate fairness or justice concerns frequently cited by liberals. Psychological theory
and previous empirical work suggest that differences between conservatives and liberals
in envy and other negative emotional reactions to wealthy people might be explained, at
least in part, by differences in their perceptions and judgments of relevant contextual
factors. Thus, I examined the extent to which contextual factors theorized to influence
differences in moral judgments and emotional reactions between conservatives and
liberals modulated conservatives’ and liberals’ reactions to wealthy people.
Political Ideology and Reactions to Wealth
Across conditions, liberals had less favorable reactions to wealthy entrepreneurs.
They reported more envy, resentment, anger, and moral disgust toward them than did
conservatives. Moreover, liberals considered the source of the wealthy entrepreneurs’
wealth and their actions in the pursuit of wealth to be less fair than conservatives, and
reported less benign envy as well. Finally, relative to conservatives, liberals considered
the entrepreneurs to be greedier and less competent. These associations tended to be
stronger when the entrepreneurs harmed others in the pursuit of wealth, but they obtained
even when the entrepreneur had done no apparent harm. Thus, liberals would appear to
like and trust wealthy people (or at least wealthy capitalists) less than conservatives
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(perhaps in part because of negative stereotyping), but these ideology-based differences
might be more pronounced when there is clear evidence that a wealthy person has harmed
others in the pursuit of wealth. Liberals’ lesser endorsement of economic justifications
for entrepreneurs’ actions (whether overtly harmful or not) heightened envy via both their
effects on fairness perceptions and directly (see Figure 6). An exploratory analysis,
moreover, suggested that differences between liberals and conservatives in the perceived
fairness of the entrepreneurs’ actions may be explained by liberals’ perceiving the actions
to be more harmful. These are important findings in terms of the persistent debate over
the origins of opposition to concentrated wealth, as they suggest that liberals’ (un)fairness
judgments are not necessarily based in envy, but rather legitimate concern for the
economic welfare of others and, perhaps, broader procedural and distributive justice
concerns. Ironically, those legitimate fairness and justice concerns promote sociallyundesirable envy and resentment. Moreover, a substantial proportion of the effect of
Liberalism on envy was not explained by fairness and justice concerns. Taken together,
these results suggest that there likely is some truth to both conservatives’ envy-based and
liberals’ justice-based explanations for the liberal tendency to oppose concentrated
wealth.
Context, Political Ideology, and Reactions to Wealth
To examine the extent to which ideology-based reactions to wealth might vary as
a function of key contextual factors, I selected and experimentally manipulated two
factors which were expected to elicit somewhat different reactions from liberals and
conservatives, based on relevant theory and research (e.g., Haidt, 2012). Specifically, I
experimentally manipulated whether the wealthy entrepreneurs to which participants
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reacted (1) came to be wealthy through a large family gift or earned their money through
hard work (Source), and whether they (2) harmed others while pursuing more wealth
(Harmful Actions). Results demonstrated that conservative-liberal differences in envious
reactions to wealth were, to a degree, context-dependent, as those differences varied as a
function of experimental condition. As noted, however, across conditions, liberals had a
general tendency toward greater envy and resentment of the wealthy entrepreneurs. As
further noted, ideology-based differences were mediated, at least in part, by fairness and
justice concerns.
Source. Effects of Source on envy and resentment were weaker, less consistent,
and somewhat less in keeping with hypotheses than those of Harmful Actions. Contrary
to predictions, there was no main effect of Source (i.e., Inherited wealth or wealth earned
through Hard Work) on envy, although there was a marginally significant Source X
Liberalism interaction. Despite obtaining an interaction as predicted, the form that
interaction took was the opposite of what was expected—rather than the Source
manipulation impacting liberals’ envy more strongly than that of conservatives, there was
only a significant effect of Source (whereby Hard Work decreased envy) among
relatively conservative participants. Further, the effect of Liberalism on envy was
significant and positive in both the Inherited and Hard Work conditions, but, contrary to
expectations, was stronger in magnitude within the Hard Work condition.
A subsequent process model examined whether Liberalism would moderate the
direct effect of Source and/or the indirect effect of Source via the perceived fairness of
the source of the entrepreneur’s initial wealth. Intuitively, and as expected, Source had a
significant indirect effect on envy whereby Hard Work lessened envy because the hard
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work was considered a fairer source of initial wealth than Inherited wealth. Liberalism
did not moderate that mediated effect, but it marginally-significantly moderated the
(marginal) direct effect of Source on envy. Interestingly, after taking into account the
stronger, negative indirect effect of Source on envy via fairness, no significant direct
effect of Source on envy remained among political conservatives, but a weak, positive
direct effect was observed among liberals. After a series of follow-up analyses described
in Results, I ultimately came to the tentative conclusion that liberals’ greater envy of
wealthy entrepreneurs in general meant that only they had an appreciable amount of envy
left over to explain after taking into account the indirect effect.
Resentment was modestly increased by Inherited wealth, but Source’s effect on
envy was not moderated by Liberalism. The lack of an interaction effect may have been a
consequence of the relatively weak effect of the manipulation itself, or it simply may
have had a similar impact on liberals’ and conservatives’ resentment of the entrepreneurs.
Although complex in a number of ways, some straightforward points can be made
about the observed pattern of effects for Source. Regardless of political affiliation,
Inherited wealth tends to be perceived as less fair than wealth earned through Hard Work,
and the effects on envy of Source are explained by such fairness judgments. Furthermore,
in line with historical example and contemporary moral psychological theories, (such as
DMT and MFT), “unfair” Inherited wealth appears to engender substantially less envy
than self-enrichment at the expense of others. For example, Inherited wealth condition
had virtually no impact on moral disgust, an emotion strongly associated with perceived
unfair treatment (e.g., Chapman et al., 2009), whereas Harmful actions greatly increased
moral disgust.

80

Harmful Actions. As expected, the manipulation with stronger effects on the
emotional reactions and moral judgments of both conservatives and liberals was Harmful
Actions. Self-enriching actions that clearly harmed others’ economic well-being
increased envy, resentment, anger, and moral disgust among people across the political
spectrum. Likewise, conservatives and liberals considered Harmful actions to be much
less fair than actions that did no apparent harm. It would appear, then, that while there
might be a degree of truth to conservative claims that liberal opposition to wealth is
driven by envy, the same might be said about conservatives who oppose it—as with
liberals, conservatives’ envy/opposition to wealth increases as a function of certain
contextual factors, such as harm, and fairness and justice concerns played prominent
explanatory roles in both conservative and liberal envy.
Although Harmful Actions had effects that were similar in kind regardless of
Political Ideology, as predicted, the mediated effect of Harmful Actions on envy via the
perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions was more pronounced among liberals
than conservatives, as liberals’ fairness judgments were more strongly affected by
Harmful Actions than those of conservatives. Such was the case despite the failure to
obtain the predicted Harmful Actions X Liberalism interaction in the multiple regression
model. This is not entirely surprising, as it is possible to obtain significant indirect effects
of a predictor which has no significant total effect (e.g., Hayes, 2009), and fairness was
predicted to be a major explanatory factor for any Harmful Actions X Liberalism
interaction. Despite the predicted moderation by Liberalism of the direct effect of
Harmful Actions on envy, in light of the results just described, the failure to obtain a
moderated direct effect was not surprising, given the non-significance of the direct effect
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of Harmful Actions on envy (i.e., the effect of Harmful Actions on envy remaining after
taking into account its indirect effect via the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s
actions). In short, harmful actions increased envy, but the increase among liberals was
more pronounced because the harmful actions were considered especially unfair by them
(and/or especially harmful; Schein & Gray, 2015).
Main effects of both Liberalism and Harmful Actions were observed on
resentment, but the predicted Harmful Actions X Liberalism interaction on resentment
was not. Two possible reasons for the latter finding come to mind. First, blatantly
harmful actions may have seemed relatively “objectively” unfair to liberals and
conservatives, increasing their resentment of the entrepreneur roughly equivalently. On
the other hand, mirroring findings on envy, there may have been no total effect of the
interaction on resentment, despite an (unexamined) indirect effect of that interaction via
enhanced unfairness perceptions.
Subjective SES
Taken together with the finding that subjective SES was only modestly zero-order
correlated with envy, results of the exploratory analysis on possible interactive effects
between Liberalism and subjective SES failed to support the notion that envious reactions
to wealthy people are primarily driven by perceived differences in SES or relative
deprivation. Instead, they buttressed the general conclusion that justice concerns are
probably more important determinants of negative emotional reactions to wealthy people,
as well as ideology-based differences in such reactions, than subjective SES. These
findings challenge the ideas that (1) links between liberal political ideology and envy
might be substantially stronger among people low in SES, and (2) coming from a low
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SES background increases only liberals’ envy—subjective SES was weakly associated
with envy, regardless of Political Ideology.
Limitations
The current study entailed measuring the self-reported judgments and emotional
reactions of online participants. The emotional reactions participants experienced were in
response to ostensibly-real, wealthy entrepreneurs. That is, participants reacted to “real”
emotional events, rather than indicating their imagined reactions to simulated events, a
potentially problematic methodology which can exacerbate underreporting of envy and
other undesirable emotions (e.g., Smith & Kim, 2007). Further, attention checks and
open-ended suspicion check questions allowed a substantial degree of data quality control
despite the remote location of the participants. Finally, because the final sample included
800 participants, statistical power was relatively high for most, if not all analyses.
Despite the considerable methodological strengths of this study, a number of
limitations must be acknowledged. First, self-reports are vulnerable to social desirability
biases and limitations in participants’ ability to accurately report the bases of their
thoughts and feelings (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Nonetheless, complex, “blended” social
emotions such as envy have proved difficult to study without using self-reports (van de
Ven et al., 2015; Hoogland et al., in press). For example, to my knowledge, there is
currently no well-validated implicit measure of envy (whether hostile or otherwise), and,
unlike anger or moral disgust, envy lacks a signature facial expression that could be
measured with EEG or other technologies. Given the relatively small effect sizes
observed in this study, it might be prohibitively costly or time-intensive to conduct well-
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powered, physiology-based research examining political ideology’s effects on emotional
reactions to wealthy people.
Arguably the greatest limitation of this study was that no manipulation of political
ideology was included (e.g., cognitive load; Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar,
2012), precluding causal conclusions from being made about the effects of political
ideology on envy. Still, the factors that were manipulated in this study had a number of
effects which were modulated by political ideology, which, at the very least, strongly
suggested that political ideology’s role in reactions to wealthy people can vary based on
pertinent contextual factors.
Future Directions
Because effects of political ideology on envy were influenced by contextual
factors, it appears possible, or even likely, that under some circumstances, conservatives
might experience more envy of wealthy people than liberals. To name one such
possibility, conservatives might begrudge the wealth of “undeserving” alternative energy
entrepreneurs who have benefitted financially from government grants to a greater extent
than liberals, who might instead feel benign envy or admiration toward them. Further,
longitudinal research might reveal if dispositional envy leads to increased liberalism,25
liberalism leads to greater dispositional envy, both, or neither.
As noted, in this and other psychological studies, unidimensional measures of
political ideology have been used successfully, but researchers such as Everett (2013)
have argued that although economic and social conservatism/liberalism are related, they
may be usefully distinguished (e.g., libertarians might be considered high in economic
Previous research has suggested that basic dispositions may drive ideological choices (Iyer, Koleva,
Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).
25
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conservatism but low in social conservatism; Everett, 2013). Economic liberalism is
probably much more relevant to reactions to wealthy people26 than social liberalism, and
thus it seems possible that social liberalism might have little impact above and beyond
economic liberalism on such reactions. An even finer-grained approach might involve
measuring whether some economic attitudes are especially predictive of reactions to
wealthy people (e.g., attitudes toward business as opposed to welfare benefits; Everett,
2013), as the consistency between attitudes and behavior increases as the attitude
becomes more specific and relevant to the behavior of interest (Kraus, 1995). Still other
measurement approaches might focus on self-identification as a liberal or conservative
rather than underlying political ideologies (Conover & Feldman, 1981), especially if a
wealthy target’s political leanings are made clear, allowing stronger intergroup dynamics
to emerge.
Another relevant empirical challenge might be to attempt to tease out when
socially- and personally-unacceptable feelings of envy might transmute into more
“righteous” resentment or indignation, anger, or even moral disgust. Might conservatives
be more adept at such a coping process than liberals? This possibility is not as far-fetched
as it might seem at first blush, as conservatives tend to claim greater happiness than
liberals,27 a difference based not only on system-justifying ideologies (e.g., Jost, 2006;

This seems especially likely when such wealthy people happen to be living relatively conventional
lifestyles.
27
See Wojcik et al. (2015) for evidence that conservatives’ greater self-reported happiness might be
mediated by their tendency toward self-deceptive enhancement (e.g., reporting unrealistic levels of
happiness), and behavioral evidence indicating liberals may experience and display (yet not report) slightly
more happiness on average than conservatives. Wojcik et al.’s (2015) work also underscored the value of
controlling for socially-desirable response tendencies in psychological research comparing liberals and
conservatives (as was the case for focal analyses in the current research).
26
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Jost & Hunyady, 2005), but also on certain personality characteristics, such as greater
personal agency (Schlenker et al., 2012).28
A final avenue for future research might be to explore why liberals may be less
trusting of wealthy people who ostensibly have earned their wealth and have not hurt
anybody in the pursuit of further wealth. Making reference to perceived justice concerns
would not appear to tell the whole story, as liberal ideology was associated with less
positive perceptions of the wealthy person within the Not Harmful condition (e.g., lesser
perceived competence and greater perceived greed). It also seems possible that those
perceptions were driven by an offended sense of distributive justice (Janoff-Bulman &
Carnes, 2013).
Conclusion
Liberals might be slightly more prone to envy. Larger ideology-related
differences in envy of specific, wealthy people, however, may be explained by legitimate
justice concerns to a substantial extent. Future research in which both political ideology
and contextual factors are experimentally manipulated will be necessary to conclusively
establish that political ideology plays a causal role in envy across a variety of situations,
rather than extraneous factors associated with political ideology or particular situations.
Nonetheless, the various complexities revealed in the current research suggest that neither

Schlenker and colleagues (2012) offered a “positive adjustment” explanation for differences in happiness
between conservatives and liberals, as conservatives tend to be higher in several characteristics positively
associated with mental health, including optimism, personal agency, religiosity, and a domain-general
belief that life is fair. They also attributed a decline in liberals’ happiness as income inequality has risen to
a concomitant increase in secularism (see General Discussion, Schlenker et al., 2012). Although Schlenker
et al.’s (2012) findings are enlightening, judgments of the fairness of wealthy people’s economic activities
were a focus of this study, and thus conservatives’ greater endorsement of economic system-justifying
beliefs were of much greater relevance to the topic at hand. Nonetheless, the extent to which either systemjustifying ideologies or overall positive adjustment provide better explanations for conservatives’ greater
self-reported life satisfaction is itself an important topic for future research.
28
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conservative nor liberal explanations for opposition to wealth fully capture a more
nuanced reality. Much more remains to be learned about the whys and wherefores of
ideology-based differences in reactions to wealthy people of varied stripes.
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Appendix A
Summary of Initial and Final Experimental Conditions
Initial Experimental Conditions
1 (Andy first)
2 (Andy first)
3 (Andy first)
4 (Andy first)
5 (Gary first)
6 (Gary first)
7 (Gary first)
8 (Gary first)

Andy X Hard Work X Not Harmful; Gary X Hard Work X Not Harmful
Andy X Hard Work X Harmful; Gary X Hard Work X Harmful
Andy X Inherited X Not Harmful; Gary X Inherited X Not Harmful
Andy X Inherited X Harmful; Gary X Inherited X Harmful
Gary X Inherited X Not Harmful; Andy X Inherited X Not Harmful
Gary X Inherited X Harmful; Andy X Inherited X Harmful
Gary X Hard Work X Not Harmful; Andy X Hard Work X Not Harmful
Gary X Hard Work X Harmful; Andy X Hard Work X Harmful

Final Experimental Conditions*
1 Hard Work X Not Harmful
2 Hard Work X Harmful
3 Inherited X Not Harmful
4 Inherited X Harmful
*NOTE: Both the order and specific company/entrepreneur (i.e., ball bearing company
buyer Gary Taylor vs. hubcap manufacturing company buyer Andy Simmons) conditions
were collapsed, yielding the final, 2 X 2 between-subjects design.
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Appendix B
Andy X Hard Work X Not Harmful Article
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Andy X Hard Work X Harmful Article

90

Andy X Inherited X Not Harmful Article

91

Andy X Inherited X Harmful Article

92

Gary X Hard Work X Not Harmful Article

93

Gary X Hard Work X Harmful Article

94

Gary X Inherited X Not Harmful Article

95

Gary X Inherited X Harmful Article
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Appendix C
Reactions to Stimulus Articles
Please indicate how reading the article made you think about or regarding [Entrepreneur]
and/or his profession by selecting a number on the scale below that best fits your view
and then entering it into the space next to each item.
Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Disagree 1. [Entrepreneur’s] actions were fair.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

[Entrepreneur’s] actions were good for the overall economy.
I believe [Entrepreneur] helped save the [Kansas/Ohio] company.
[Entrepreneur] is a very skilled businessperson.
I am a little envious of [Entrepreneur].
[Entrepreneur] did his duty for his investors by taking the actions he did with the
[Kansas/Ohio] company.
[Entrepreneur] harmed the company in [Kansas/Ohio].
[Entrepreneur] is greedy.
[Entrepreneur’s] initial wealth was earned through hard work.
[Entrepreneur’s] initial wealth was given to him by family.
The way [Entrepreneur] got his initial wealth was fair.
[Entrepreneur’s] source of startup money was fair.
I resent [Entrepreneur’s] actions.
I resent [Entrepreneur’s] wealth.
It is frustrating that [Entrepreneur] is better off than I am.
This is an attention check. Please choose answer “3” for this question.
[Entrepreneur] seems to be intelligent.
I feel inspired to get wealth myself.
[Entrepreneur’s] actions were disgusting.
[Entrepreneur’s] wealth is disgusting.
I want to put in effort to obtain wealth myself.
I hope [Entrepreneur] suffers a serious financial setback.
I like [Entrepreneur].
I am a little jealous of [Entrepreneur’s] wealth.
[Entrepreneur’s] way of turning around companies is good for the country.
I think about what it would be like to have [Entrepreneur’s] wealth.
[Entrepreneur] harmed the workers in the [Kansas/Ohio] company.
[Entrepreneur’s] actions with the company were unfair.
[Entrepreneur’s] actions make me angry.
[Entrepreneur’s] wealth makes me angry.
Reading about [Entrepreneur] makes me want to work harder.
I wish [Entrepreneur] weren’t so successful.
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33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

I can’t help but resent [Entrepreneur] for his success.
[Entrepreneur] is a great role model.
I want to have [Entrepreneur’s] wealth as well.
[Entrepreneur] lacks compassion for company employees.
I am happy for [Entrepreneur].
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Appendix D
Individual Differences Measures

Political Ideology Scale (endpoints: 1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree)
(Adapted from Morgan et al., 2010)
1. I agree with Democrats on political issues.
2. I agree with Republicans on political issues.
3. I am liberal in my political views.
4. I am conservative in my political views.
Dispositional Envy Scale (endpoints: 1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) (Smith
et al., 1999)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

I feel envy every day.
The bitter truth is that I generally feel inferior to others.
Feelings of envy constantly torment me.
It is so frustrating to see some people succeed so easily.
No matter what I do, envy always plagues me.
I am troubled by feelings of inadequacy.
It somehow doesn’t seem fair that some people seem to have all the talent.
Frankly, the success of my neighbors makes me resent them.

Dispositional Benign and Malicious Envy Scales (endpoints: 1 = strongly disagree, 6
= strongly agree) (Lange & Crusius, 2014)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

When I envy others, I focus on how I can become equally successful in the future.
I wish that superior people would lose their advantage.
If I notice that another person is better than me, I try to improve myself.
Envying others motivates me to accomplish my goals.
If other people have something that I want for myself, I wish to take it away from
them.
6. I feel ill will toward people I envy.
7. I strive to reach other people’s superior achievements.
8. Envious feelings cause me to dislike the other person.
9. If someone has superior qualities, achievements, or possessions, I try to attain
them for myself.
10. Seeing other people’s achievements makes me resent them.
Short Social Desirability Scale (endpoints: 1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree)
(Reynolds, 1982)
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of
my ability.
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4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even
though I knew they were right.
5. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
7. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
8. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious
people.
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings
Subjective SES “Ladder” Scale (Ditto et al., 2013)
Think of this ladder, to the right, as
representing where people stand in your
country.

->
->

At the top of the ladder are the people who are
the best off - those who have the most money,
the most education, and the most respected jobs.
At the bottom are the people who are the worst
off - who have the least money, least education,
and the least respected jobs or no job. The higher
up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to
the people at the very top; the lower you are, the
closer you are to the people at the very bottom.

->

Where would you place yourself on this
ladder?
Please choose the radio button corresponding to
the position on the ladder where you think you
stand at this time in your life, compared to
people in your country.

->

100

->
->
->
->
->

->

References
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The
authoritarian personality. New York: Harper & Row.
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. Winnipeg, Canada: University of
Manitoba Press.
Altemeyer, B. (1996). The authoritarian specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Aristotle (350 B.C.E./1924). Rhetoric. In W. Rhys Roberts (Trans.), The Works of
Aristotle (Vol. 9). London: Oxford University Press.
Barber, M., & McCarty, N. (2015). Causes and consequences of polarization. In N.
Persily (Ed.), Solutions to political polarization in America (pp. 15-58). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Batson, C. D., Kennedy, C. L., Nord, L. A., Stocks, E. L., Fleming, D. Y. A., Marzette,
C. M., ... & Zerger, T. (2007). Anger at unfairness: Is it moral outrage?. European
Journal of Social Psychology, 37(6), 1272-1285.
Berkowitz, L. (1989). Frustration-aggression hypothesis: Examination and reformulation.
Psychological Bulletin, 106(1), 59-73.
Berkowitz, L. (1990). On the formation and regulation of anger and aggression: A
cognitive-neoassociationistic analysis. American Psychologist, 45(4), 494-503.
Berkowitz, L., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2004). Toward an understanding of the determinants
of anger. Emotion, 4(2), 107–130.

101

Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love and outgroup
hate?. Journal of Social Issues, 55(3), 429-444.
Brown-Iannuzzi, J. L., Lundberg, K. B., Kay, A. C., & Payne, B. K. (2015). Subjective
status shapes political preferences. Psychological Science, 26(1), 15-26.
Carney, D. R., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2008). The secret lives of liberals
and conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles, and the things they
leave behind. Political Psychology, 29(6), 807-840.
Chapman, H. A., & Anderson, A. K. (2013). Things rank and gross in nature: a review
and synthesis of moral disgust. Psychological Bulletin, 139(2), 300-327.
Chapman, H. A., & Anderson, A. K. (2014). Trait physical disgust is related to moral
judgments outside of the purity domain. Emotion, 14(2), 341-348.
Chapman, H. A., Kim, D. A., Susskind, J. M., & Anderson, A. K. (2009). In bad taste:
Evidence for the oral origins of moral disgust. Science, 323(5918), 1222-1226.
Clark, J. A., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2015). The role of disgust in norms, and of norms in
disgust research: Why liberals shouldn’t be morally disgusted by moral disgust.
Topoi, 34(2), 483-498.
Clinton, H. (2016, May) Hillary Clinton Statement on New Department of Labor
Overtime Rules. Retrieved from
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/statements/2016/05/18/hillary-clintonstatement-on-new-department-of-labor-overtime-rules/
Cohen, J. (1977). Statistical power analysis for behavioral sciences (Revised Ed.). New
York: Academic Press.

102

Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple
regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Cohen-Charash, Y. (2009). Episodic envy. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39(9),
2128-2170.
Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. (1981). The origins and meaning of liberal/conservative
self-identifications. American Journal of Political Science, 25(4), 617-645.
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24(4), 349-354.
Darley, J. M., & Pittman, T. S. (2003). The psychology of compensatory and retributive
justice. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7(4), 324-336.
Davis, S. (2012, April 16). Senate fails to advance Buffett Rule. USA Today. Retrieved
from http://www.usatoday.com
Ditto, P., Graham, J. Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Sherman, G., & Wojcik, S.
(2013). [Graphic ladder and text] Your Morals Project. Retrieved from
https://www.yourmorals.org/register.php?grp=&goto=
Duffy, M. K., Scott, K. L., Shaw, J. D., Tepper, B. J., & Aquino, K. (2012). A social
context model of envy and social undermining. Academy of Management Journal,
55(3), 643-666.
Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. (2007). Methods for integrating moderation and
mediation: a general analytical framework using moderated path
analysis. Psychological Methods, 12(1), 1-22.

103

Eidelman, S., Crandall, C. S., Goodman, J. A., & Blanchar, J. C. (2012). Low-effort
thought promotes political conservatism. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 38(6), 808-820.
Engel, S., & Martin, B. (2015). Challenging economic inequality. Economic & Political
Weekly, 50(49), 42-48.
Escobedo, T. (2016, April 14). How did Andrew Jackson go from revered to reviled?.
CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/31/politics/andrew-jacksonfrom-revered-to-reviled/
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses
using G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior
Research Methods, 41(4), 1149-1160.
Feather, N. T. (2006). Deservingness and emotions: Applying the structural model of
deservingness to the analysis of affective reactions to outcomes. European Review
of Social Psychology, 17(1), 38-73.
Feather, N. T. (2012). Tall poppies, deservingness and schadenfreude. The Psychologist,
25(6), 434-437.
Feather, N. T., & Sherman, R. (2002). Envy, resentment, schadenfreude, and sympathy:
Reactions to deserved and undeserved achievement and subsequent failure.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(7), 953-961.
Fernandez, E., & Turk, D. C. (1995). The scope and significance of anger in the
experience of chronic pain. Pain, 61(2), 165-175.

104

Fischer, D. G., & Fick, C. (1993). Measuring social desirability: Short forms of the
Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale, Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 53(2), 417-424.
Floyd, T. M., Hoogland, C. E., & Smith, R. H. (2016). The role of leaders in managing
envy and its consequences for competition in organizations. In S. Braun, C. Peus,
& B. Schyns (Eds.), Leadership lessons from compelling contexts (pp. 129-156).
Bradford, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.
Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal,
and emotional action readiness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
57(2), 212-228.
Fritz, M. S., & MacKinnon, D. P. (2007). Required sample size to detect the mediated
effect. Psychological Science, 18(3), 233-239.
Gollwitzer, M., & van Prooijen, J. W. (2016). Psychology of justice. In C. Sabbagh & M.
Schmitt, (Eds.), Handbook of social justice theory and research (pp. 61-82). New
York: Springer.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different
sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5),
1029-1046.
Graham, J., Nosek, B., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. (2011). Mapping the
moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366-385.
Gray, K., & Schein, C. (2012). Two minds vs. two philosophies: Mind perception
defines morality and dissolves the debate between deontology and
utilitarianism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(3), 1–19.

105

Gray, K., Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2012). The moral dyad: A fundamental template
unifying moral judgment. Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 206-215.
Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind. New York: Random House, Inc.
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral
intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research, 20(1), 98-116.
Harris, C. R., & Henniger, N. E. (2013). Envy, politics, and age. Frontiers in Psychology,
4(67), 1-5.
Hayes, A. F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation analysis in the new
millennium. Communication Monographs, 76(4), 408–420.
Hayes, A. F. (2012). PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed variable
mediation, moderation, and conditional process modeling [White paper].
Retrieved from http://www.afhayes.com/ public/process2012.pdf
Hayes, A. F. (2015). An index and test of linear moderated mediation. Multivariate
Behavioral Research, 50(1), 1-22.
Hayes, A. F., & Cai, L. (2007). Using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error
estimators in OLS regression: An introduction and software
implementation. Behavior Research Methods, 39(4), 709-722.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: John Wiley &
Sons.
Hirsh, J. B., DeYoung, C. G., Xu, X., & Peterson, J. B. (2010). Compassionate liberals
and polite conservatives: Associations of agreeableness with political ideology
and moral values. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(5), 655-664.

106

Hodson, G., & Costello, K. (2007). Interpersonal disgust, ideological orientations, and
dehumanization as predictors of intergroup attitudes. Psychological Science,
18(8), 691-698.
Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1985). Interpersonal attraction, social identification and
psychological group formation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 15(1),
51-66.
Hoogland, C. E., Thielke, S., & Smith, R. H. (in press). Envy as an evolving episode. In
R. Smith, U. Merlone, & M. Duffy (Eds.), Envy at work and in organizations:
Research, theory, and applications. New York: Oxford University Press.
Huff, C. & Tingley, D. (2015). “Who are these people?”: Evaluating the demographic
characteristics and political preferences of MTurk survey respondents. Research
and Politics, July-September 2015, 1-12.
IBM Corp. (2013). IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 22.0. Armonk, NY: IBM
Corp.
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2009). Conservatives are more easily disgusted
than liberals. Cognition and Emotion, 23, 714-725
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D., Iyer, R., & Haidt, J. (2012). Disgust sensitivity, political
conservatism, and voting. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(5),
537-544.
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., Knobe, J., & Bloom, P. (2009). Disgust sensitivity predicts
intuitive disapproval of gays. Emotion, 9(3), 435-439.

107

Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Graham, J., Ditto, P., & Haidt, J. (2012). Understanding libertarian
morality: The psychological dispositions of self-identified libertarians. PloS
One, 7(8), 1-23.
Izard, C. E. (1993). Four systems for emotion activation: cognitive and noncognitive
processes. Psychological Review, 100(1), 68-90.
Janoff-Bulman, R. (2009). To provide or protect: Motivational bases of political
liberalism and conservatism. Psychological Inquiry, 20(2-3), 120-128.
Janoff-Bulman, R., & Carnes, N. C. (2013). Surveying the moral landscape moral
motives and group-based moralities. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
17(3) 219-236.
Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. American Psychologist, 61(7), 651670.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003a). Political
conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339375.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003b). Exceptions that
prove the rule—using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for
ideological incongruities and political anomalies: Reply to Greenberg & Jonas
(2003). Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 383-393.
Jost, J., & Hunyady, O. (2003). The psychology of system justification and the palliative
function of ideology. European Review of Social Psychology, 13(1), 111-153.
Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of system-justifying
ideologies. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(5), 260-265.

108

Jost, J. T., Napier, J. L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S. D., Palfai, T. P., & Ostafin, B.
(2007). Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political
conservatism or ideological extremity?. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 33(7), 989-1007.
Kraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of behavior: A meta-analysis of the
empirical literature. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(1), 58-75.
Krizan, Z., & Hoogland, C. E. (manuscript in preparation). Dispositional schadenfreude.
Lange, J., & Crusius, J. (2015). Dispositional envy revisited: Unraveling the motivational
dynamics of benign and malicious envy. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 41(2), 284-294.
Leach, C. W., & Spears, R. (2008). “A vengefulness of the impotent”: The pain of ingroup inferiority and schadenfreude toward successful out-groups. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6), 1383-1396.
Leach, C. W., Spears, R., Branscombe, N. R., & Doosje, B. (2003). Malicious pleasure:
schadenfreude at the suffering of another group. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 84(5), 932-943.
Lerner, M. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York:
Plenum Press.
Levendusky, M. (2009). The partisan sort: How liberals became Democrats and
conservatives became Republicans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Loewenstein, A. (2013). Profits of doom: How vulture capitalism is swallowing the
world. Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Publishing.

109

Loo, R., & Thorpe, K., (2000). Confirmatory factor analyses of the full and short versions
of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. Journal of Social Psychology,
140(5), 628-635.
McClelland, G. H., & Judd, C. M. (1993). Statistical difficulties of detecting interactions
and moderator effects. Psychological Bulletin, 114(2), 376-390.
Morgan, G. S., Mullen, E., & Skitka, L. J. (2010). When values and attributions collide:
Liberals' and conservatives' values motivate attributions for alleged misdeeds.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(9), 1241-1254.
Murphy, K. R., & Myors, B. (2004). Statistical power analysis. Mahwah: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Napier, J. L., & Jost, J. T. (2008). Why are conservatives happier than liberals?.
Psychological Science, 19(6), 565-572.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports
on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231-259.
Norton, M. I., & Ariely, D. (2011). Building a better America—One wealth quintile at a
time. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1), 9-12.
Norton, M. I., Neal, D. T., Govan, C. L., Ariely, D., & Holland, E. (2014). The not‐so‐
common‐wealth of Australia: Evidence for a cross‐cultural desire for a more
equal distribution of wealth. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 14(1),
339-351.
Obama, B. (2013, December). Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility. Speech
presented at THEARC, Washington, D.C.

110

Paolacci, G., & Chandler, J. (2014). Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as
a participant pool. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(3), 184-188.
Parker, K. (2013, December 31). Dream the American Dream in 2014. The Washington
Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com
Parrott, W. G. (1991). Experiences of envy and jealousy. In P. Salovey (Ed.), The
psychology of jealousy and envy, (pp. 3-30). New York: Guilford Press.
Parrott, W. G., & Smith, R. H. (1993). Distinguishing the experiences of envy and
jealousy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(6), 906-920.
Powell, C. A. J., Smith, R. H., & Schurtz, D. R. (2008). Schadenfreude caused by an
envied person’s pain. In R. H. Smith (Ed.), Envy (pp. 148-164). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing moderated mediation
hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions. Multivariate Behavioral
Research, 42(1), 185-227.
R Core Team (2013). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. ISBN 3-900051-07-0,
http://www.R-project.org/
Rasinski, K. (1987). What’s fair is fair-or is it? Value differences underlying public views
about social justice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(1), 201211.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reynolds, W. M. (1982) Development of reliable and valid short forms of the MarloweCrowne social desirability scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38(1), 119-125.

111

Richard, F. D., Bond, C. F., Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, J. J. (2003). One hundred years of social
psychology quantitatively described. Review of General Psychology, 7(4), 331363.
Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis: A
mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three
moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity). Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 76(4), 574-586.
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2015). The unifying moral dyad: Liberals and conservatives
share the same harm-based moral template. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 41(8), 1147-1163.
Schein, C., Ritter, R. S., & Gray, K. (in press). Harm mediates the disgust-immorality
link. Emotion.
Schlenker, B. R., Chambers, J. R., & Le, B. M. (2012). Conservatives are happier than
liberals, but why? Political ideology, personality, and life satisfaction. Journal of
Research in Personality, 46(2), 127-146.
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral
judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(8), 1096-1109.
Smith, R. H. (1991) Envy and the sense of injustice. In P. Salovey (Ed.), The psychology
of jealousy and envy (pp. 79-97). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Smith, R. H. (2013). The joy of pain: Schadenfreude and the dark side of human nature.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, R. H., & Harris, M. J. (2006). Multimethod approaches in social psychology:
Between-and within-method replication and multimethod assessment. In M. Eid

112

& E. Diener (Eds.), Handbook of multimethod measurement in psychology (pp.
385-400). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Smith, R. H., & Kim, S. H. (2007). Comprehending envy. Psychological Bulletin, 133(1),
46-64.
Smith, R.H., Parrott, W.G., Diener, E., Hoyle, R.H., & Kim, S.H. (1999). Dispositional
envy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(8), 1007-1020.
Smith, R. H., Parrott, W. G., Ozer, D., & Moniz, A. (1994). Subjective injustice and
inferiority as predictors of hostile and depressive feelings in envy. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(6), 705–711.
Smith, R. H., Thielke, S. M., & Powell, C. A. (2014). Empirical challenges to
understanding the role of envy in schadenfreude. In W. W. van Dijk & J. W.
Ouwerkerk (Eds.), Schadenfreude: Understanding pleasure at the misfortune of
others (pp. 91-109). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Taibbi, M. (29 August 2012). Greed and debt: The true story of Mitt Romney and Bain
Capital. Rolling Stone, 1165(September 13, 2012). Retrieved from
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/greed-and-debt-the-true-story-of-mittromney-and-bain-capital-20120829
Tesser, A. (1988). Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of social
behavior. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 181-227.
Tesser, A., Millar, M., & Moore, J. (1988). Some affective consequences of social
comparison and reflection processes: The pain and pleasure of being
close. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(1), 49-61.

113

Tetlock, P. E., & Mitchell, G. (1993). Liberal and conservative approaches to justice:
Conflicting psychological portraits. In B. A. Mellers & J. Baron (Eds.),
Psychological perspectives on justice: Theory and applications (pp. 234-255).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tyler, T. (2011). Procedural justice shapes evaluations of income inequality:
Commentary on Norton and Ariely (2011). Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 6(1), 15-16.
UShistory.org (n.d.). The rise of the common man. Accessed online at
http://www.ushistory.org/us/24a.asp
van de Ven, N. (2015). Envy and admiration: Emotion and motivation following upward
social comparison. Cognition and Emotion. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2015.1087972
van de Ven, N., Hoogland, C. E., Smith, R. H., van Dijk, W. W., Breugelmans, S. M., &
Zeelenberg, M. (2015). When envy leads to schadenfreude. Cognition and
Emotion, 29(6), 1007-1025.
van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Pieters, R. (2009). Leveling up and down: the
experiences of benign and malicious envy. Emotion, 9(3), 419-429.
van Dijk, W. W., Goslinga, S., & Ouwerkerk, J. W. (2008). Impact of responsibility for a
misfortune on schadenfreude and sympathy: Further evidence. The Journal of
Social Psychology, 148(5), 631-636.
van Dijk, W. W., Ouwerkerk, J. W., & Goslinga, S. (2009). The impact of deservingness
on schadenfreude and sympathy: Further evidence. Cognition and Emotion,
149(3), 290-292.

114

Wojcik, S. P., Hovasapian, A., Graham, J., Motyl, M., & Ditto, P. H. (2015).
Conservatives report, but liberals display, greater happiness. Science, 347(6227),
1243-1246.
Yzerbyt, V. Y., Muller, D., & Judd, C. M. (2004). Adjusting researchers’ approach to
adjustment: On the use of covariates when testing interactions. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 40(3), 424-431.
Zeelenberg, M., Nelissen, R. M., Breugelmans, S. M., & Pieters, R. (2008). On emotion
specificity in decision making: Why feeling is for doing. Judgment and Decision
Making, 3(1), 18-27.

115

VITA
Charles E. Hoogland
EDUCATION

2009-2011
Wake Forest University
M.A. in General Experimental Psychology


Thesis title: The effects of upward social comparisons on affect and
subsequent
task persistence and performance in cooperative and competitive contexts

2003-2007
B.A. in Psychology

2005

Winston-Salem, NC

Wabash College




Summa cum laude
Minor: History



University of Aberdeen
Studied psychology, history, and art history abroad

Crawfordsville, IN

Aberdeen, Scotland

PUBLICATIONS

Hoogland, C. E., Thielke, S., & Smith, R. H. (in press). Envy as an evolving episode. In
U. Merlone, M. Duffy, & R. Smith (Eds.), Envy at work and in organizations:
Research, theory, and applications. New York: Oxford University Press.
Floyd, T. M., Hoogland, C. E., & Smith, R. H. (in press). The role of leaders in
managing envy and its consequences for competition in organizations. In S.
Braun, C. Peus, & B. Schyns (Eds.), Leadership lessons from compelling contexts.
Bradford, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.
Hoogland, A. I., & Hoogland, C. E. (in press). Learning by listing: A content analysis of
students’ perceptions of older adults and grandparents. Journal of Gerontology
and Geriatrics Education.
Hoogland, C. E., Schurtz, D. R., Cooper, C. M., Combs, D. J. Y., Brown, E. G., &
Smith, R. H. (2015). The joy of pain and the pain of joy: In-group identification
predicts schadenfreude and gluckschmerz following rival groups’ fortunes.
Motivation and Emotion, 39(2), 260-281.
van de Ven, N., Hoogland, C. E., Smith, R. H., van Dijk, W. W., Breugelmans, S. M., &
Zeelenberg, M. (2015). When envy leads to schadenfreude. Cognition and
Emotion, 29(6), 1007-1025.

116

Inoue, Y., Hoogland, C. E., Takehashi, H., & Murata, K. (2015). Effects of resource
divisibility and expectations of sharing on envy. Motivation and Emotion, 39(6),
961-972.
Schurtz, D. R., Combs, D., Hoogland, C., & Smith, R. H. (2014). Schadenfreude in
sports and politics: A social identity perspective. In W. van Dijk & J. Ouwerkerk
(Eds.) Schadenfreude: Understanding pleasure at the misfortune of others.
London: Cambridge University Press.
Webster, J. M., Hoogland, C. E., Schurtz, D. R., & Smith, R. H. (2014). Excessive
image concern and willingness to incur personal cost in the experience and
perception of vanity. Self and Identity, 13(5), 613-637.
TEACHING EXPERIENCE

2016, Spring
Primary Instructor
Social Psychology and Cultural Processes (PSY 314)

University of Kentucky

2015, Summer
Primary Instructor
University of Kentucky
Application of Statistics in Psychology (PSY 216)
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 Four consecutive semesters.
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envy: The effects of sustained envy and target likeability on envy through time.
Poster presented at the 2014 National Conference for Undergraduate Research,
Lexington, KY.
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Hoogland, C., Smith, R. K., Thielke, S. M., Kim, S. H., & Smith, R. H. (2012).
Exploring how varieties of envy, inferiority, and resentment are linked with
schadenfreude. Poster presented at the Kentucky Psychological Association’s
annual spring conference, Lexington, KY.
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When good news strikes: Self-evaluation threat, counterfactual comparisons, and
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University of Kentucky Graduate School Travel Funding ($400).....................2015
University of Kentucky Psychology Department Travel Award ($1000) .........2015
University of Kentucky Psychology Department Travel Award ($750) ...........2014
University of Kentucky Psychology Department Travel Award ($750) ...........2013
Quantitative Initiative for Political Science Research grant ($500) ..................2013
University of Kentucky Psychology Department Travel Award ($750) ...........2012
Psychology Department research grants ($500 x 2) ................................ 2011-2012
Reedy Quality Scholarship Award at University of Kentucky ................ 2011-2014
University of Kentucky First Year Fellowship ........................................ 2011-2012
Summer Research Grant at University of Kentucky ($2500) ............................2011
Summer Research Grant at Wake Forest University ($500) .............................2010
Distinction on Senior Comprehensive Exams at Wabash College ....................2007
Phi Beta Kappa (National Academic Honor Society)........................................2007
Psi Chi (National Psychology Honor Society)...................................................2006
Phi Alpha Theta (National History Honor Society) ...........................................2006
George D. Lovell Award at Wabash College ....................................................2006
 For outstanding achievement in the social sciences.
Givens Award for the Study of Art in Europe at Wabash College ....................2005
 Studied history of Western Art at University of Aberdeen;
received and used stipend to visit leading European art
museums.
Tau Kappa Epsilon Freshman Scholarship at Wabash College .........................2004
President’s Scholarship at Wabash College…………………………… . 2003-2007
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 Liaison to department chair for social area graduate
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 Resulting book published by the National Institute for Trial Advocacy in
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